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INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
An important question in determining the usefulness of any per­
sonnel practice involves the expected costs and benefits of the practice 
to the organization. Activities such as selection, training, and per­
formance appraisal may involve substantial expenditures of time and money; 
yet, only rarely is the "bottom line" dollar benefit of a given program 
considered at all. 
Landy and Farr (1983) noted that personnel research often comes 
under attack because of its seemingly superficial concern for cost-
effectiveness. According to Cascio (1980), human resources management 
activities (i.e., those activities associated with the attraction, se­
lection, retention, development, and utilization of people in organiza­
tions) are generally evaluated in either behavioral terms (such as reac­
tion measures, learning tests, or observations of changes in employee be­
havior) or statistical terms (such as percentages, means, standard devia­
tions, or correlation coefficients). Landy, Farr, and Jacobs (1982) 
noted that, for several decades, psychologists have faced the problem of 
determining the usefulness of various strategies which are important in 
the personnel process. Roche (in Cronbach & Gleser, 1965) mentioned that 
the development of a meaningful criterion of an employee's performance is 
probably the most important problem facing the personnel psychologist. 
Traditionally, the method of choice has been to follow the path of 
least resistance, and global measures such as supervisor ratings of 
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performance have been used to represent a complex, multi-faceted be­
havior. This often means that determination of whether or not organi­
zational goals are being met is difficult at best and sometimes im­
possible. 
In attempts to document the efficacy of personnel procedures, 
industrial psychologists have suggested a variety of criteria against 
which their activities should be judged. These criteria include the 
increase in the number of "successful" employees hired, the increase in 
average level of performance among employees, or, more recently, the 
amount of savings (through use of the program or activity) in terms of 
dollars. Cascio (1980) pointed out that a reluctance to assess personnel 
practices in monetary terms has persisted, although he also noted that 
several different methods for cost-benefit analyses have been available 
for many years. The reluctance seems to stem from the long-standing 
belief that human resource functions are somehow "different" from all 
other organizational activities and, as such, are not amenable to inter­
pretation in the context of dollars. 
An area which as traditionally been accorded a great deal of concern 
in the context of human resources activities is selection. Effective 
selection (that is, choosing the most appropriate candidates in a fair 
and cost-efficient manner) is obviously of critical importance in the at­
tainment of organizational goals. The actual monetary value of (more) 
effective selection, however, is rarely, if ever, addressed. 
An almost universally used personnel practice is performance ap­
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praisal, which refers, simply, to the evaluation of employee performance, 
either for administrative purposes (such as compensation) or for direc­
tive purposes (such as training). Although widely used (indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine an organization where employee performance is not 
appraised), it is difficult to find instances where the cost of per­
formance appraisal versus the potential benefits of such appraisal is 
systematically assessed. This makes it difficult to determine if one 
approach to performance appraisal might be preferable to another in terms 
of attainment of various organizational objectives. 
Another important illustration of the inadequacy of traditional 
approaches to evaluating personnel practices concerns training, also re­
ferred to as "human resources development." Industrial training is de­
fined by Goldstein (1980) as the acquisition of skills, concepts, or 
attitudes intended to result in improved performance in an on-the-job 
environment. The goal or purpose of training may vary from personal growth 
to improved organizational efficiency; however, typically the only type of 
evaluation involves assessing employee reactions to the training. While 
such reactions are obviously important in the assessment of face validity 
(i.e., the extent to which trainees feel the training is appropriate), 
they are woefully inadequate in determining the "bottom-line" benefit of 
training to the organization. Given the fact that organizations in the 
United States spend upwards of several billion dollars annually on train­
ing (Wexley & Latham, 1981), the over-emphasis on trainee reactions as the 
sole measure of efficacy of training is particularly suspect. 
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According to Goldstein (1980), in the most primitive kind of evalu­
ation, appropriate measurement methodology is ignored and decisions are 
based upon anecdotal trainee (and sometimes trainer) reactions. Most 
analysts realize the limits of this approach; however, this is still the 
"typical" (i.e., most common) approach. At the other end of the rigor 
continuum is the kind of approach which may be just as unproductive in 
terms of providing usable information. This approach is based on strict 
adherence to the basic experimental methodologies of academic labora­
tories. Frequently, such designs are completely inappropriate in terms 
of the limitations of the organizational environment; as such, they are 
often abandoned in frustration before any conclusions are reached. The 
most appropriate strategy would thus be one which strove for a balance 
between unstructured and over-structured — i.e., one that could provide 
both the researcher and the personnel practitioner with usable, easily 
interpretable information. A consideration which may further complicate 
the evaluation of the efficacy of training concerns distributional as­
sumptions. Little attention is given to assessing the distribution of 
performance before training; even less is given to assessing whether the 
training itself affects the shape of the performance distribution. In­
deed, it might reasonably be argued that the major goal of training is 
to shift the performance distribution in such a way that it becomes nega­
tively skewed. 
Note that nearly all approaches to evaluating human resources ac­
tivities have one of two major limitations: Either they are inadequate 
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to determine if the activity is really effective (and, if so, effective 
in what sense) or they require more employees/subjects than are typical­
ly available. Only occasionally are such activities subject to any sort 
of cost-benefit analyses. In the rare instances where attention is 
given to determining the cost-benefit ratio of a particular personnel 
function, no attempts are made to determine if the underlying assump­
tions on which the interpretability of such analyses rests are met. 
A simple summarization of the inadequacy of traditional approaches 
to evaluating the organizational effectiveness of various human resources 
activities was provided by Brodgen (1950), who noted that "the general 
objective of firms is to make money. This is not indicative of a ma­
terialistic attitude; it is simply the truth. No company can stay in 
business without at least breaking even." It is thus cogent to ask how 
any personnel practice affects an organization's ability to do so. In 
terms of many personnel functions, such as selection, training, and per­
formance appraisal, no typically used measure will allow an assessment 
of this criterion. 
Landy and Farr (1983) observed that, despite the fact that various 
approaches to cost-benefit analysis in a variety of h'jman resources func­
tions have been available for many years, few attempts to systematically 
document cost-benefit concerns can be found. This, they contend, is most 
probably due to two major reasons: 
(1) Until recently, most applications of cost-benefit concerns 
involved testing. Since testing has, from time to time, 
come under attack from a fair employment view, it is under­
standable that procedures correlative to testing have also 
been ignored. 
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(2) Many procedures central to cost-benefit analyses have not been 
subject to rigorous theoretical examination. 
As such, it is understandable that a reluctance to employ such 
analyses continues. 
In light of the above considerations, this study has several major 
purposes: First, the historical development of various approaches to 
evaluating the effectiveness of personnel practices, in general, and of 
different kinds of personnel programs, in particular, will be described 
in detail, along with the important limitations (both theoretical and 
practical) of these different approaches. One potentially viable ap­
proach to addressing the need for accountability in human resources func­
tions relies on utility analysis, which refers to an estimate of benefits 
expected to result from a particular decision. Several researchers (i.e., 
Schmidt, Hunter, McKenzie, & Muldrow, 1979; Schmidt, Hunter, & Pearlman, 
1982) have suggested that utility analysis is appropriate for cost-benefit 
studies of personnel functions. Specifically, they contend that parame­
ters of organizational settings are similar enough to the theoretical as­
sumptions of utility theory to warrant application of the theory. 
Boudreau (1983b) noted that, although mathematical equations for 
expressing the utility of selection devices in monetary terms have been 
available for more than 30 years, such equations have not been widely 
used. He contended that this failure to employ them may be due to sever­
al reasons, such as misconceptions regarding the necessary statistical 
relationships, the assumption that costly validity studies are necessary 
in every situation, and the difficulty of accurately estimating the vari­
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ability of job performance in dollars. 
Though actual use of utility theory to determine potential mone­
tary benefits is apparently not widespread (Landy & Farr, 1983), an 
important preliminary step in the demand for accountability involves 
the determination of robustness. No studies to date have rigorously 
investigated the sensitivity of the utility function to violations of 
its underlying assumptions. Because "real-life" data (i.e., that which 
are 'collected in an actual organization) may differ substantially from 
theoretical expectations, it is critical to determine if departures from 
such assumptions affects the viability of the function's use. As such, 
the major purpose of this study is to examine the robustness of the 
utility function. Such variables as the number of employees involved 
(i.e., the number tested or trained) and the cost of the activity are 
relatively straightforward and, hence, are not subject to a great deal 
of misinterpretation. Other variables, however, such as the distribu­
tions of predictor performance, job performance, etc., may be consider­
ably less straightforward and thus need tc be rigorously examined, in the 
context of their potential impact on organizational decision-making. 
In the context of this study, the term utility will be used to 
refer to the expected benefits assumed to result from a particular 
organizational decision or course of action. Robustness will, of 
course, refer to the sensitivity of the utility model (as it may be ap­
plied to various personnel functions) to departures from underlying 
theoretical assumptions. It is expected that an examination of the 
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robustness will help assess the feasibility of using the function in an 
applied setting and is thus an important first step on the road to ac­
countability in human resources activities. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to illustrate some of the limitations of traditional meth­
ods of assessing the usefulness of personnel practices, as well as demon­
strate the applicability of utility analysis, some review is necessary. 
More attention has been given to selection than any other specific aspect 
of the personnel process; thus, any review must necessarily emphasize an 
analysis of selection, followed by attempts to extend the logic to other 
personnel functions. 
Theoretical Models 
Munsterberg (1914) had first noted the importance of differential 
placement into jobs according to aptitudes; he pointed out the now-obvious 
fact that people differ in terms of abilities and are thus differentially 
suited for placement into different types of jobs. 
Hull (1928) enlarged upon Munsterberg's notions in an early approach 
tc the quantification of work performance (a necessary first step in the 
assessment of monetary gain or loss). Hull conceived of using the ratio 
of best-to-poorest worker as a means of targeting individual differences 
in work performance. Though simple, Hull's approach has some intuitive 
appeal. He implied that utility might be gained by moving the mean of 
the performance distribution up towards the high end of the performance 
scale; this is graphically illustrated in Figure 1, where, obviously, 
the overall performance of the workgroup as a whole can be improved by 
attention to those workers who are on the low end of the performance dis-
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Figure 1. Effect of performance improvement on group mean 
tribution (relatively). 
Tnis could be accomplished by substituting more competent workers 
for their less competent colleagues, either through more precise initial 
selection procedures or through on-the-job training procedures. Hull was 
basically enlarging upon Munsterberg's ideas by noting that periormance 
variation could occur within, as well as across, particular jobs. Note 
that even at this early stage, it was recognized that the usefulness of 
the best-to-poorest worker ratio would depend at least partially on 
the nature of the job in question. In some types of jobs, lictle per­
formance variation occurs. For example, the ratio of best-co-pooresc 
worker may be as low as 1:1.4 for heel trimmers and as high as 1:5.1 for 
spoon polishers (Hull, 1928). 
A potential problem with Hull's model concerns the assumption of a 
s^rmnecrical distribution of performance. It is doubtful that such sym­
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metry would be found often in practice, as extremely poor workers enjoy 
little, if any, job tenure; thus, their low performance scores would tend 
to drop out of the distribution of performance scores. While in theory 
this would simply narrow the range of performance scores, in actual prac­
tice it may prove difficult to interpret the resulting ratio. For ex­
ample, the "poorest" worker (relatively speaking) may still be one whose 
performance is adequate. A related problem involves the difficulty of 
quantifying output in some types of jobs. Many jobs (such as manager, 
engineer, police officer, to name several) simply do not lend themselves 
to easy quantification of output. 
Indices 
The validity coefficient, the most common means for assessing the 
efficacy of a particular selection method, is usually defined as the 
correlation of test score with outcome or criterion score. (Note that 
in this context, the term "test" may refer to any selection device, in­
cluding, for example, paper-and-pencil tests, interviews, letters of 
recommendation, etc.) 
A nuEber of different approaches to interpreting the validity co­
efficient have been proposed. All are relatively simple functions of ^  
which bear directly upon an evaluation of the extent to which one vari­
able may be predicted from the other when the correlation coefficient 
is of a given magnitude. Eistorically, the oldest approach is the 
index of forecasting efficiency, where ^  = 1 - /I - r^. This index 
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compares the standard error of scores predicted by means of the test 
to the standard error of scores when there is no information on the in­
dividual and the group mean must be used as an estimator of the indi­
vidual's score. The proportionate reduction of the standard error is 
taken as a measure of the value of the test. 
A modification of this is called the coefficient of alienation, k, 
where k = /(I - r^) (Kelley, 1923). Taylor and Russell (1939) de­
scribed where ^  = /k/2. Another approach uses , the coefficient 
of determination, as a means of assessing the value of the selection 
device. This expression is intended to illustrate the value of the se­
lection device by expressing the ratio of predicted (or "explained") 
variance to total variance. Logically, the more variance in job per­
formance that can be explained, the more valuable the test for selection. 
Taylor and Russell (1939) also recognized the importance of indi­
vidual differences and added the concepts of validity, selection ratio 
(proportion of candidates who are actually selected), and base rate (pro­
portion of present employees who are considered successful). They noted 
that traditional approaches to evaluating the correlation coefficient as 
the appropriate measure of selective efficiency have one important draw­
back in common. As the size of the correlation coefficient increases, 
the extent to which one variable can be predicted from the other in­
creases more rapidly. They contended that widespread acceptance of such 
measures as the correct way of evaluating correlations led to consider­
able pessimism with regard to the magnitudes of correlations usually ob— 
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cained in employment settings. Their model was intended to demonstrate 
that when the tests are used for selection, correlations within the 
range of .20 to .50 (the magnitudes which are most frequently found in 
employment settings) may represent considerably more than 2% to 13% of 
the effectiveness of a correlation of unity. 
Such concepts underscore the fact that the value of a given test 
for selection varies as a function of the parameters of the situation in 
which it is used. The Taylor-Russell model assumed normality of both 
predictor and underlying criterion variables, linearity of the regres­
sion of the criterion on the predictor, and a validity coefficient in the 
form of a Pearson product-moment correlation. Their model can be graph­
ically depicted as follows: 
predictor 
criterion 
cut-off 
reject accept 
In this schema, A represents employees who met or exceeded the predictor 
cut-off and later proved to be successful in terms of job performance. 
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B represents employees who met or exceeded the predictor cut—off but 
whose job performance was unsatisfactory. C represents those who were 
rejected (or the basis of predictor performance) and would have been 
unsatisfactory employees had they been hired. D represents candidates 
who were rejected but who would have been successful had they been 
hired. (Note that C and D are hypothesized groups, as candidates who 
were rejected on the basis of their predictor performance could obvious­
ly not be evaluated on later job performance.) 
Taylor and Russell also constructed a set of tables which demon­
strated that even a selection device with seemingly low validity (i.e., 
a modest test-criterion correlation) can substantially increase the pro­
portion of selectees who will be successful (although this expected in­
crease is largely a function of the proportion of current employees who 
are considered successful). 
A major problem with the Taylor-Russell model concerns the neces­
sity of arbitrarily dividing employees into only two groups: successful 
and unsuccessful. It is unlikely that an employee who barely meets a 
min-i-muTn standard for qualifying as "successful" is as valuable to the 
organx^aCioii as one who ils substantially above the cut-off - (A related 
problem concerns the decision of where to draw the line separating suc­
cessful from unsuccessful employees. Such a decision is generally some­
what arbitrary and, as such, is highly vulnerable to the imposition of 
values.) Another potential problem was noted by Smith (1948) who pointed 
out that the Taylor-Russell tables, as ordinarily used, tend to over­
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estimate prospective gains in effectiveness because of their failure to 
allow for known pre-existing validities and selection ratios. The ta­
bles assume that the applicant group and the present employee group are 
similar; this is equivalent to assuming that 100% of all applicants 
are being hired and retained, that current selection procedures have 
zero validity, or that both conditions exist. Such assumptions are un­
realistic, as it is very likely that the present selection ratio is less 
than 1.0 and the validity of^present selection procedures (unless ran­
dom selection is in use) is greater than 0.0. Obviously, these consider­
ations limits the effective use of the model in most organizational set­
tings . 
As early as 1946, Brogden formally demonstrated that is not ap­
propriate for interpreting the validity coefficient in the context of a 
selection decision. He emphasized the notion of evaluating decisions 
directly on a utility scale to interpret the validity coefficient; he 
concluded that the gain from use of a test in selection is linearly 
related to the validity of the test. Brogden showed that a test's 
validity is a linear function of the difference between the mean for 
the "successful" group and the mean for the population. Also, he 
showed that ^ equals the proportion improvement over chance that %s 
possible with different selection ratios. Brogden's approach helped 
illustrate a major weakness of both E and r_ (and modifications there­
of, as noted above). Both may give an overly pessimistic view of the 
"real" value of a given test for selection. If r_ = .50, for example. 
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^ describes the test as predicting only 13% better than chance, while 
2^ describes the same test as accounting for 25% of the variance. An­
other potential weakness involves the lack of intuitive meaning of 
either term. To describe a particular test as explaining 25% of the 
variance in job performance is somewhat imprecise in terms of predict­
ing what benefits may accure to the organization through use of the 
test. Likewise, describing the same test as reducing the standard er­
ror by 13% is equally imprecise in an applied sense, as well as intui­
tively meaningless to the typical personnel practitioner. Such a de­
scription obviously does not provide any idea of the true practical value 
of the test to the organization. 
The model proposed by Brogden and Taylor (1950) emphasized the im­
portance of a dollar unit as the most desirable criterion of industrial 
efficiency. Their model was based on Brogden's earlier formulations and 
assumed identical (but not necessarily normal) and continuous distribu­
tions for predictor and criterion, as well as linearity of the regres­
sion of the criterion on the predictor and a constant selection ratio. 
Brogden (1946) had shown that when these assumptions are met, the validi­
ty coefficient itself is a direct index of selective efficiency. If cri­
terion performance is expressed in standard score units, then over all 
individuals r^ represents the ratio of the average criterion score made 
by persons selected on the basis of their predictor scores (Zz^). 
The model involved rescaling such factors as production, errors, 
accidents, etc., into a standard dollar metric. Such rescaling, when 
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applied to the assessment of work performance, allowed an estimate of 
an individual's contribution to the organization. Brogden and Taylor 
also proposed extending such logic to training costs, turnover, and on-
the-job productivity to show the potential value of an applicant or 
employee. In using their cost accounting procedures to develop a dol­
lar criterion, a number of elements must be considered. Brogden and 
Taylor listed the following as examples: 
1. average value in dollars of production or service 
units 
2. quality of objects produced or services performed 
3. overhead 
4. errors, accidents, etc. 
5. where applicable, public relations factors 
6. cost of time of other personnel consumed 
Although theoretically sound, their model is still plagued by the un-
tenability of the assumption that performance is identically distributed. 
A more practical drawback concerns the extensive investment in cost-
accounting procedures necessary to use the model appropriately. A sub­
stantial investment in time and money is required to accurately assess 
all relevant costs. This may make potential benefits less than antici­
pated (i.e., the cost of determining costs and benefits may be sub­
stantially greater than potential benefits). 
The Naylor-Shine model (1965) assumed a linear relationship between 
validity and utility which holds true at all selection ratios. Unlike the 
Taylor-Russell model, however, their model does not require arbitrary 
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dichotomization of employees into satisfactory-unsatisfactory groups. 
Naylor and Shine also constructed a set of tables which can help deter­
mine mean increase in average standardized criterion score for the se­
lected group over that observed for the total group. Note, however, 
that while this is somewhat interpretable in terms of performance expec­
tations, it still does not describe the value to the organization of us­
ing that test; nor does their model easily lend itself to personnel 
functions other than selection. 
Cronbach and Gleser (1965) proposed a modification of the Brogden-
Taylor model. Customarily, they noted, the value of a test is inter­
preted in terms of improvement over chance. They suggested that expected 
outcome under any strategy should be evaluated on an absolute utility 
scale. The value of a strategy which employs a test should be compared 
to the utility from the best "a priori" strategy — that is, the best 
strategy not using the test. The difference between the two is the gain 
from testing and is positive or negative depending on the cost of the 
test. (This implies that an extremely expensive test, even one which 
is highly accurate in terms of prediction, may be more detrimental than 
helpful, because the added cost of using it more than negates added bene­
fits. Thus, although precision may be great, the cost of precision may 
be too high.) 
The Cronbach-Gleser model is based on the general utility equation 
from decision theory. This general equation makes no distributional as­
sumptions about the variables involved (although certain equations de-
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rived from it for specific situations do). Accordingly, the equation 
is: 
U = NZp? ZPc/Yt ®c - KZPyCy 
where 
U = utility of the set of decisions 
N = number of persons about whom decisions are made 
Y = information category 
t = treatment 
c = outcome 
e =value of outcome 
c 
= cost of gathering information 
A drawback to convenient use of this equation is its inapplicability for 
yielding results interpretable with respect to industrial decisions. 
Accordingly, the equation was modified to make it more tenable for dif­
ferent types of selection. 
Cronbach and Gleser described two major types of selection decisions 
fixed treatment, where individuals are chosen for one specific treatment 
which cannot be modified, and adaptive treatment, in which the decision 
maker is allowed to adjust the treatment according to the quality of in­
dividuals chosen. Also, decisions may involve quotas (where a fixed num­
ber of individuals must be selected), or flexible quotas, where the de­
cision maker has the option of accepting as few or as many individuals as 
desired, depending on the qualifications of the candidate pool. 
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In fixed treatment selection, the basic goal of the decision maker 
is to accept those individuals whose expected pay-off is highest, within 
the constraints of what information is available and what quota may have 
to be filled. As such, the net gain in utility per man tested from se­
lection for a fixed treatment is linearly related to the value of the 
test: 
U = r SD Z 
ye e y 
This equation is based on the following assumptions : 
1. Decisions are made regarding an indefinitely large 
population of persons. This "a priori" population 
consists of all applicants after screening by any 
procedure now in use that will continue to be used. 
2. Regarding any person there are two possible decisions: 
Accept or reject. 
3. Each person has a test score y. with mean = 0 and standard 
deviation = 1. 
4. For every person, there is a payoff which results when 
the person is accepted. This payoff has a linear regres­
sion on test score. The test will be scored so that r^ 
is positive. 
5. T^hen a person is rejected, the payoff e^g results. This 
payoff is unrelated to test score, and may be set equal 
to zero. 
6. The average cost of testing a person on test y is C^, 
where is greater than zero. 
7. The strategy will be to accept high scoring individuals 
in preference to others. A cutoff of y will be located 
on the y continuum so that any desired proportion (p') 
of the group falls above y'. Above that point, proba­
bility of acceptance is 1.00; below it, 0.00. 
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Cronbach and Gleser also developed equations appropriate for fixed 
treatments with variable quotas and for adaptive trestments with both 
fixed and variable quotas. 
This model re-emphasized the importance of cost, as they noted 
that any selection procedure should be assessed in terms of its incre­
mental contribution relative to the best strategy available using prior 
information. If, as Brogden (1950) had pointed out, the criterion 
can be expressed in cost-accounting terms as an estimate of the dollar 
savings obtained by selecting a given individual instead of an average 
applicant and r^ gives the percentage of possible savings, then the 
product (r )(& ) [where O is criterion standard deviation in dollars] 
-xy y y 
estimates the increase in saving per unit increase in standard score. 
Thus, any new procedures must represent an improvement over current 
practices. Cronbach and Gleser also pointed out that the cost of a se­
lection procedure is of great importance, as even a "perfect" means of 
selection (i.e., where a correlation of 1.0 between predictor and cri­
terion exists) could be of little or no value if the costs associated 
with using it are too great. Note that this is an important consider­
ation in the use of any personnel procedure. A seemingly effective train­
ing program (i.e., one which substantially improves work performance over 
base rate), may cost more than the gain in performance is worth to the 
organization. In such a case, the logic of describing such a training 
program as effective is obviously suspect. This underscores the need for 
a means of objectively quantifying in monetary terms the cost-benefit 
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ratio of any personnel practice, including selection, training, per­
formance appraisal, etc. 
Applications 
Roche (in Cronbach & Gleser, 1965) described the application of 
the Brogden-Cronbach-Gleser model to an industrial setting. To arrive 
at a reasonable estimate of the profit which accrues to the organization 
as a result of an employee's work, the cost accounting methods developed 
by the company (a manufacturer of heavy equipment) were used. Basically, 
the method is one of standard costing, a commonly-used technique in 
volume production accounting. Standard cost for the company's products 
was determined fay obtaining cost data on three basic factors: material 
used in production, direct labor hours used to operate on materials, and 
facility usage required to perform direct labor. The payoff for each 
individual depended on a productivity measure called the performance ra­
tio. For each machining operation, the Time Study Division of the organ­
ization had established a time standard. The length of time required for 
a competent operator to complete the machining operation was established 
by standard time study procedures; thus, the number of parts per hour that 
an operator should be able to process was known. An operator's performance 
ratio for any period of work was then computed by dividing actual produc­
tion by standard hourly production. Each operator's payoff was determined 
by computing a typical performance ratio (mean performance over the six-
month duration of the study), adjusting this performance ratio for below 
standard production, and computing average profit of adjusted typical per­
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formance ratio with data provided by the company's Cost Analysis Divi­
sion. The cost of testing involved only the actual costs of the tests 
themselves. Roche concluded that the results of his study demonstrated 
that a dollar criterion could be developed (albeit with some expense 
and effort incurred) for a typical fixed treatment employee selection 
procedure. 
Curtis and Alf (1969) examined the functional relationship between 
three indices of predictive efficiency: r^, , and and three measures 
of practical significance: increase in criterion mean, expected propor­
tion judged "satisfactory," and expected proportion in 10 criterion cate­
gories. Overall, r^ was judged to be the best measure in terms of a linear 
relationship with the measures of practical significance. Both and 
according to Curtis and Alf, may lead to unrealistically pessimistic eval­
uations of the potential value of the test. 
Sands (1973) proposed a model called CAPER (Cost of Attaining Per­
sonnel Requirements) which helped to determine an optimal recruiting-
selection strategy. Specifically, the CAPER model provided the personnel 
manager with all the information necessary to minimize the expected costs 
of selecting, inducting, and training a sufficient number of persons to 
meet some specific quota of satisfactory personnel. Sands noted that the 
CAPER model had several important advantages over more traditional ap­
proaches. First, it allowed communication of easily-interpretable re­
sults — specifically, results which were stated in terms of dollars. 
Also, it recognized the fact that the selection procedure has important 
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implications for the entire personnel system. In contrast to a tra­
ditional correlational model (i.e., one where the sole means for evalu­
ating the efficacy of a particular means of selection is the magnitude 
of the correlation coefficient), the CAPER model takes into account the 
utility or cost of various decision-outcome combinations, including cor­
rect selection and rejection and erroneous selection and rejection. 
In order to effectively use the CAPER model, as it is described by 
Sands, the following information is required: the quota, the base rate, 
and the proportion of previous successes and failures. Also, the fol­
lowing cost data per person must be specified: recruiting, selection, 
training, erroneous acceptance, and erroneous rejection. Such informa­
tion is, according to Sands, usually readily available; thus, the imple­
mentation of the model is fairly easy and well worth the time and/or 
money investment required. (Note, however, that at least some arbitrary 
value judgments are required. For example, how should the cost of er­
roneous rejection be determined? Obviously, this value may be determined 
differently by different people.) 
Schmidt and Hoffman (1973) compared actual savings resulting from 
the use of a selection device to savings predicted from (a) the Taylor-
Russell interpretation, (b) Brogden's interpretation, and (c) the general 
utility equation of decision theory. The utility analysis was applied 
to a weighted application blank developed to predict turnover among 
nurse's aides. They concluded that the most accurate estimate was ob­
tained with the general decision theory equation using empirical (rather 
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than theoretical) probabilities. 
Lee and Booth (1974) performed an analysis to assess the poten­
tial monetary value of using a cross-validated weighted utility blank 
for selection. They pointed out that a cost-benefit analysis was con­
sidered a necessary step in terms of justification of the use of the 
blank. By means of a questionnaire distributed to supervisors of cler­
ical employees, they determined the average time spent in supervision 
of new employees for progressive one-month periods after initial hire. 
From this and other values, four costs associated with turnover were de­
rived; cost of recruiting, cost of supervisory training, cost of loss 
of employee productivity during training period, and cost of fringe bene­
fits during training period. Their analysis also employed the selection 
rate and base rate as variables. They estimated maximum savings in se­
lection to be approximately $250,000. Though they pointed out that var­
iations in supply and demand may affect the amount of savings, they also 
contended that the utility estimates of the weighted application blank 
are large enough to be significant from a practical point of view — 
large enough, in fact, to warrant utility analysis of other approaches 
to selection in order to accurately assess the practical benefit of 
various selection strategies. 
Cascio and Sibley (1979) evaluated the utility of the assessment 
center as a selection device by means of the Brogden-Cronbach-Gleser 
continuous variable utility model. They first noted that, although the 
assessment center approach has received much kudos from a traditional 
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psychometric point of view, it has also been legitimately criticized for 
ignoring certain external parameters of the situation that may largely 
determine the overall value of utility of a selection device. Six such 
parameters were identified and systematically varied: validity and cost 
of the assessment center, validity of the alternative selection proce­
dure (i.e., the "a priori" strategy), selection ratio, standard devia­
tion of criterion (in other words, performance) in dollars, and number 
of employees assessed. They concluded that, given the appropriate set 
of parameters, significant savings in dollars could be realized through 
use of the assessment center and, as such, use of the assessment center 
approach as a selection device would be appropriate. 
Perhaps, the most important contribution to the use of utility theory 
in the context of selection decisions involved the 1979 study by Schmidt, 
Hunter, McKenzie, and Muldrow. Their analysis examined the potential 
savings which could accrue to the federal government through use of se­
lection devices with different levels of validity. They first noted that 
the coefficient of determination continues to be used as a measure of the 
efficacy of a selection device, although its use may reflect an under­
estimate of the true value of a valid selection test. This is a function 
of the fact that the magnitudes of validity coefficients typically ob­
served in industrial settings make most tests appear to be only moderate­
ly predictive of future performance. Analogously, assessing the value of 
a training program by simply asking employees their reactions is not suf­
ficient to determine what, if any, tangible benefits may accrue to the 
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organization through the use of that training method. 
As an alternative, Schmidt et al. proposed using the term "utility" 
to describe an analysis of the potential benefits associated with the use 
of a given selection device. Berkson (1947) had originally defined util­
ity as the proportion of unsuccessful candidates eliminated and cost as 
the proportion of successful applicants rejected. Blum and Naylor (1968) 
defined the utility of a particular selection device as the degree to 
which use of that selection device serves to improve the quality of those 
selected beyond what would have occurred had that selection device not 
been used. Quality may be defined in several different ways as (1) the 
proportion of individuals in the selected group who are considered suc­
cessful, (2) the average standard score on criterion for the selected 
group, or (3) the dollar payoff to the organization resulting from the 
use of a particular selection device. Note that it is relatively simple 
to extend this logic to describe the utility of other personnel functions, 
such as training: The utility of a training program is the degree to 
which its use improves the quality of those trained beyond what would 
have occurred had no such training been used. 
Cronbach and Gleser (1965) provided perhaps the most useful defini­
tion. They described utility analysis as the determination of institu­
tional gain or loss expected to result from various courses of action 
(outcomes). This general definition is easily applicable to other per­
sonnel functions: For example, what degree of objectives (i.e., monetary) 
gain or loss can be expected to result from different kinds of training 
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decisions? Likewise, what degree of monetary gain might be realized 
from the implementation of a more effective performance appraisal sys­
tem? Such a question might reasonably be asked of virtually any kind 
of human resource activity, including recruiting, selection, placement, 
training, performance appraisal, promotion, layoff, discharge, etc. 
Given the above considerations, the equation Schmidt et al. em­
ployed as most appropriate in terms of organizational decision making 
was 
AU = t N(r^ - r^)SD^ (jj/p - N(C^ - C^)/? 
where 
AU = expected change in utility 
t = average tenure of individual in the organization 
N = number of persons tested 
r^ = validity of proposed selection procedure 
r^ = validity of current selection procedure 
SD^ = standard deviation of performance expressed in dollars 
<j) = ordinate of normal curve expressed at point p 
p = selection ratio 
= cost of proposed procedure 
= cost of current selection procedure 
They concluded that the computation of SD^, the standard deviation 
of performance in dollars, has typically been the Achilles' heel of de­
cision-theoretic attempts to assess the utility of a selection device. 
Their approach involved using a questionnaire-type instrument to ask 
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supervisors of computer programmers about their estimates of the value 
of poor, average, and good programmers. (Supervisors were instructed 
to consider the cost of hiring programmers from outside the government.) 
Again, however, the determination of SD^ rested on the tentative assump­
tion that performance is normally distributed. [Note that Tiffin and 
Vincent (1960) investigated the problem of empirical versus hypothetical 
distributions with respect to the Taylor-Russell tables; they concluded 
that the two distributions matched quite well and use of hypothetical 
distributions is generally appropriate in most research situations. No 
other attempts to document the match of theoretical versus empirical dis­
tributions of the various cost-benefit approaches exist.] Accordingly, 
in a later reformulation, Schmidt, Hunter, and Pearlman (1982) simplified 
this admittedly somewhat time—consuming procedure by contending that SD^ 
is equal to approximately 40% of annual salary. Schmidt et al. (1979) 
determined that the annual savings that could be realized ranged from 
several million dollars to well over a billion dollars. 
Another attempt to apply this approach involved a study by Schmidt, 
Hunter, and Pearlman (1982). They contended that the model could also 
be applied to the training function, and, as such, they reformulated the 
equation as follows: 
AU = T N SD d - NC y 
where 
AU = the dollar value of the training program 
T = the number of years duration of the training effect 
on performance 
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N = the number of persons trained 
d = the true difference in job performance between the 
average trained and untrained employee in SD units 
SD = the standard deviation of job performance in dollars 
^ of the untrained group 
C = the cost of training per trainee 
Actual computations involved using hypothetical values of T, N, SD^, d, 
and C, rather than actual data; thus, their results should be considered 
illustrative rather than conclusive. They contended, however, that the 
dollar value of at least some interventions designed to improve employee 
performance may be more significant than usually assumed. Perhaps, more 
importantly, they concluded that the linear regression-based decision-
theoretic equations previously used to assess the impact in dollars of 
valid selection procedures on workforce productivity can be adapted to 
the evaluation of employee intervention (in other words, training) pro­
grams. 
An obvious weakness of Schmidt et al.'s (1982) conclusion concerns 
their use of hypothetical, rather than actual, data. Although their 
conclusions are at least minimally encouraging (particularly from the 
point of view of the trainer, who may be especially interested in a 
dollar estimate of the effectiveness of training), their approach pro­
vides a model for potential application, rather than an empirical demon­
stration of actual savings. A potentially more serious criticism con­
cerns the lack of attention given to the distributions of performance 
before and after training. Even if it is reasonable to assume that per­
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formance is normally distributed before training, it can also be reason­
ably argued that the major purpose of training is to shift the distribu­
tion of performance from normal to somewhat negatively skewed (i.e., 
fewer "poor" performers and more "good" performers). 
Landy and Farr (1983) described an attempt to apply the Schmidt et 
al. utility model to the performance appraisal function. Specifically, 
they wished to estimate the dollar value of the feedback component of 
effective performance appraisal. Accordingly, they used the following 
equation: 
AU = t N d SDy - N(C^ - C^) 
where 
ATJ = expected increase in utility 
N = 500 
d = .60 (as estimated from a literature review) 
SD = $20,000 (using the approach suggested by Schmidt et 
^ al.) 
C = $700 per employee (as calculated from the costs of 
developing the program, the time requir-d for the 
training of evaluators, and the time required for 
supervisors to carry out and feed back the results 
of the evaluation, as well as the "down time" of 
the manager being evaluated) 
= $00 (there had been no prior procedure; hence, there 
was no prior cost) 
Given these parameters, they concluded that the utility of introducing 
a performance evaluation and feedback system would be approximately 5.3 
million dollars for one year. A major flaw in their approach concerns 
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the computation of SD^. No specific information was addressed to the 
concern of whether performance of managers is really normally distributed, 
either before or after the training intervention (a major assumption of 
the Schmidt et al. model). As such, their conclusions (while certainly 
positive) are somewhat suspect in terms of the tenability of the under­
lying assumptions. 
Despite Schmidt et al.'s contention that all personnel programs are 
amenable to utility analysis, little, if any, effort to systematically 
estimate the value of training in dollars has been undertaken. Ford 
(1984) in a fairly typical study of the efficacy of training programs, 
conducted an analysis to determine the benefits of using a Personalized 
System of Instruction (PSI) to a large personnel training system. A 
quasi-experimental randomized design was employed to compare a PSI ap­
proach to health care training with traditional techniques. "Effective­
ness" was determined by examining performance means in training modules 
and performance appraisal data after 90 days on the job. "Efficiency" 
was measured by recording the number of hours each trainee spent in 
training, as it was assumed that the less time spent in training, the 
greater the efficiency of that training. Costs were assessed by evalu­
ating the cost of the PSI purchase and upkeep against the cost of tra­
ditional training. Ford concluded that the PSI approach was far superior 
in terms of both better performance and lower cost. Note that Ford did 
not address the issue of translating performance into any dollar criteria. 
For example, he did not consider potential savings to the organization 
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that could result through implementation of PSI as the primary method of 
training. While his results are encouraging and certainly point to the 
implmentation of PSI as the training method of choice, they are obviously 
inadequate in evaluating how lauch benefit in dollars could be realized 
through PSI. 
Burke and Day (1986) conducted a meta-analysis of available studies 
on managerial training in an effort to determine the extent to which 
such training, which they term "pervasive," is effective. They concluded 
that managerial training is, on the average, moderately effective. How­
ever, despite their contention that managerial training programs are quite 
widespread, they were able to locate only 70 studies that included one or 
more control groups. Perhaps, more importantly, their definition of "ef­
fectiveness" is largely bound by the criteria of effectiveness used in the 
different studies. The large majority of studies included (23) involved 
performance ratings as criteria; such ratings would fall into subjective 
evaluations of bheavior as described by Kirkpatrick (1976). Only three 
studies employed such objective measures as decrease in error rates as 
criteria; none examined the cost-benefit ratio of managerial training. 
While Ford's research (and that of others who have examined various 
aspects of the personnel process in terms of their usefulness) is cer­
tainly laudable, it is at best only an imprecise representation of the 
real extent to which an organization might benefit from an effective and 
viable training program. It was noted above that traditional approaches 
to evaluating the efficacy of different types of selection instruments 
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generally tend to underestimate the true value of such instruments. 
Logically, the same might be said for other personnel functions. For 
example, it is reasonable to argue that the real value of training to 
an organization (that is, the value of the training in dollars) is sub­
stantially greater than usually assumed. The same argument might be 
made for other human resources functions. As such, it is cogent to ask 
if cost-benefit analyses based on the logic and assumptions of utility 
theory (as developed by Cronbach & Gleser, 1965) could reasonably be 
applied to the gamut of personnel functions. Before calling for whole­
sale application of the model, however, it is important to recognize that 
frequently there may be a discrepancy between the assumptions of the model 
and the nature of "real-life" data findings. As such, a necessary step 
Involves a study of the robustness of the model — the extent to which 
it is relatively insensitive to violation of its underlying assumptions. 
This is critical in the applicability of the model, as frequently the 
underlying assumptions may not be met in actual practice; thus, it is im­
portant to determine how various departures from the model's assumptions 
affect the viability of the model as a solution to the problem of ac­
countability in the human resource function. 
A potential problem pointed out by several researchers (Bobko, Karren, 
& Parkington, 1983; Weekley, Frank, O'Connor, & Peters, 1985) centers on 
the question of the true distribution of performance. The Schmidt et al. 
(1979) technique is based on the rationale that if job performance (the 
criterion) is normally distributed, then the difference between the values 
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of the products and services produced by the average employee (i.e., 
one at the 50th percentile) and those produced by an employee at the 85th 
percentile in performance should be equal to the standard deviation of 
the criterion. 
In Schmidt et al.'s original study, they determined that estimates 
of the difference between the 15th and 50th percentiles were "sufficient­
ly" equivalent to estimates of the difference between the 50th and 85th 
percentiles; thus, they concluded that the distribution of performance 
was approximately normal. However, as Bobko et al. point out, the fact 
that the two standard deviation estimates were similar is not an adequate 
test of the normality assumption. Equivalence of the estimates is, they 
note, a necessary but not sufficient condition for normality. 
Using a sample of 92 insurance counselors, Bobko et al. conducted a 
study to determine if standard deviations as estimated by the Schmidt et 
al. global estimation approach reproduced actual standard deviations. 
Though they concluded that the Schmidt et al. estimation procedure is 
quite accurate in reproducing actual standard deviations, an inspection 
of the data they present indicates otherwise. For example, the differ­
ence between the 15th and 50th percentiles was estimated by supervisors 
to be 62, while the actual standard deivation was 47.3. Similarly, the 
difference between the 50th and 85th percentiles was estimated to be 48.8 
when the actual figure was 55.5. This indicates that not only are super­
visor's estimates discrepant from actual data, but the distribution itself 
may not be symmetrical. 
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Another problem specific to this study concerns the judgments su­
pervisors employed in making their estimates. Bobko et al. admit that 
judgments may be based on knowledge of annual salaries; this indicates 
that the estimations may be somewhat circular in nature and, as such, 
it makes little sense to ask supervisors when their judgments are based 
on existing data. 
Weekley, Frank, O'Connor, & Peters (1985) noted that there are three 
major methods of estimating SD^: the 40% rule, the Schmidt et al. (1979) 
global estimation technique, and the CREPID procedure. Because the de­
termination of the expected utility of a particular personnel practice is 
so contingent on an accurate estimate of SD^, they suggested that a sys­
tematic analysis of the correspondence between these three approaches be 
undertaken. As such, they randomly selected 196 supervisors from a larger 
sample of 600 and asked them to make estimates of SD^ using both the 
Schmidt et al. global estimation technique and the CREPID technique. 
(Note that the 40% approach can be used by simply examining salary data.) 
Their results indicated that the CREPID method and the 40% of annual 
salary method produced comparable results that differed substantially 
from the results produced by the Schmidt et al. global estimation tech­
nique- Significantly large differences in the estimation of SD^ could 
obviously result in incorrect (or at least nonoptimal) decisions. As 
such, they suggest using multiple measures of SD^ as a precaution against 
overzealousness in interpretation. 
Given the discrepancies in SD estimation techniques apparent in 
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even these preliminary studies, it is cogent to consider the robustness 
of the utility model if it is to be considered a potentially viable means 
of assessing cost-benefit ratios of personnel activities. Interestingly, 
only a few studies have examined the robustness of the SD^ term (which, 
in actual practice, may prove to be the most difficult to estimate); no 
studies to date have examined the tenability of the (|)/p term (or its ana­
log in areas of personnel functions other than selection) as the most ap­
propriate estimate of the distribution of predictor performance. Such 
terms as "increase in validity" (i.e., in terms of selection, training, 
etc.) and cost of the specific personnel function are relatively straight­
forward and intuitively meaningful; however, the multiplicative effect of 
these terms on the overall estimates of expected utility (i.e., when 
combined with inaccurate or inappropriate quantities of 4i/p and SD^) has 
not yet been rigorously investigated. 
Other experts have pointed out factors which may complicate the ap­
plicability of the utility function as a whole, not only the SD^ term. 
Boudreau (1983b), for example, pointed out that typical utility analyses 
are based on models that assume a personnel/human resources program is 
applied to only one group of applicants cr employees. Results of such 
studies express the utility or gain expected to result from adding one 
treated cohort to the existing workforce (i.e., in the context of selec­
tion) or from applying some personnel program to all or part of the exist­
ing workforce (i.e., training or performance feedback). He pointed out, 
however, that program utility need not be studied only in single groups 
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or cohorts; programs (and, hence, utility analyses of such programs) can 
be conducted continuously as new members enter the organization's work­
force. 
Boudreau (1983a) argued that investments in personnel programs must 
be evaluated similarly to other investment options. He contended that 
previous conceptual demonstrations have, indeed, integrated decision 
theory and industrial psychology concepts, but have failed to devote 
sufficient attention to economic theory and its implications. 
Specifically, Boudreau argued that the "payoff" definition (i.e., 
the value of products and services, as defined by Schmidt et al., 1979) 
is a deficient expression of "institutional" benefit. Their definition 
fails to reflect certain economic considerations which are basic to or­
ganizational investment decisions. Utility estimates made using this -
deficient definition of payoff may produce payoff estimates which are 
upwardly biased when evaluated in terms of payoff estimates for other 
benefits. In view of these deficiencies, Boudreau suggested extending 
the utility model to consider variable costs, taxes, and discounting. 
In view of these concerns, systematic quantitative analyses off the 
sensitivity of the utility function to departures from underlying sta­
tistical assumptions (specifically, in terms of the (j)/p term and the SD^ 
term) must be undertaken before calling for widespread implementation of 
the model as the most appropriate means for examining cost-benefit con­
cerns in human resources functions. The remainder of this study will be 
concerned with such analyses. 
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METHOD 
A necessary analysis in assessing the feasibility of the utility 
model, as noted above, involves the determination of the robustness of 
the utility function — that is, its sensitivity to departures from 
underlying assumptions. To the extent that the model is not seriously 
affected by such departures (particularly, in terms of the SD^ and 
({>/p terms), it is considered to be robust (and, hence, would be widely 
applicable, as the assumptions may be violated in many real-life situa­
tions) . As such, several major analyses will be conducted. 
First, the model as is (specifically, in terms of the formulation 
suggested by Schmidt et al. in their 1979 study of the utility of a 
more valid selection device) will be examined in terms of its sensitivi­
ty to deviations from a normal distribution of job performance. This 
set of analyses will involve onlv the SD term of the model. y 
Specifically, a "truncated" normal distribution of job performance 
will be considered- The logic for using this type of distribution is 
as follows. Assume that if the organization could retain all those em­
ployees initially hired, the resulting distribution of job performance 
would, indeed, be normal, or nearly normal. However, it is likely that 
the organization has some standard or cutoff of job performance, below 
which workers have to be eliminated. This would mean that at some point 
along the baseline (i.e., the scale of job performance), the normal 
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distribution will be truncated. The severity of truncation depends, 
obviously, on the performance standards used. (Note that this considera­
tion — whether the SD^ is intended to describe the performance of all 
workers, or only of those workers who are actually hired — is largely 
ignored in most utility analyses). 
Schmidt et al.*s (1979) global estimation technique, as noted above 
involves asking experts (i.e., supervisors) to estimate SD^'s by estimât 
ing what they would have to pay a worker at the 15th, 50th, and 85th 
percentiles. The accuracy of their estimates is based on an assumption 
of a normal distribution of criterion performance. If supervisors are 
instructed to use the model as is and estimate these three data points 
when the underlying distribution is not normal, this may seriously af­
fect the observed AU, because the distance between the 15th and 85th 
percentile points will vary from distribution to distribution, thus, 
resulting in an inaccurate estimate of SD^. Computationally, experts/ 
supervisors are expected to estimate SD^ as follows: 
SDy = 
- 2 
where 85^ = performance at SSth percentile, and 
15y = performance at 15th percentile. 
In a truly normal standardized distribution, this quantity will equal 
1; thus, any discrepancy (i.e., any deviation from 1) reflects error in 
the estimation of the SD^ (which would obviously translate into error 
in the expected value of AU). 
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This can be graphically illustrated as follows: 
In a normal distribution, the relevant area would be 
+1(7 +2(7 +3(7 2<r 0 3ff lo­
in a truncated normal distribution, the area might vary from a 
point at one standard deviation below the mean: 
+10- +20- +3cr 0 lo­
to a point one standard deviation above the mean: 
0 -3(7 -2(T -Iff +ia +2(7 +30" 
Determination of the robustness of this term will be undertaken 
in two separate steps. First, integral calculus will be used to ob­
tain the density function for any truncated normal distribution. This 
density function will then be used to calculate the exact standardized 
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variance (and, hence, SD^') for a range of truncated normal distribu­
tions. This set of SD^'s will then be compared to 1 to assess the mag­
nitude of error in distributions that are progressively nonnormal. 
4>/p 
A second major analysis will involve an investigation of the term 
reflecting performance on the predictor, $/p. As used in the model, 
this term refers to the height of the normal curve at point £. More 
generally, this refers to the average performance of the selected group 
(i.e., those who meet or exceed the predictor cut-off). Note, however, 
that if the distribution of predictor performance is not normal, this 
specific term is inappropriate. In a nonnormal distribution, the height 
of the curve at point ^ will reflect a different density (i.e., a dif­
ferent percentage of individuals beyond point £). This can be graphical­
ly illustrated as follows: 
In a normal distribution of predictor performance, the organization 
may decide to use £ = Û as the cutoff for accept versus reject. This 
means that all those individuals in the shaded region would be considered 
acceptable candidates: 
+itr +2cr +3(7 0 -3(7 -20- -liT 
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If the distribution is actually negatively skewed but the organiza­
tion uses the same cut-off point and makes selection decisions as if 
the distribution were normal, then the proportion of individuals falling 
above ^  (i.e., the proportion of candidates who would be considered ac­
ceptable for hire) is illustrated by the shaded region. The extent to 
which this proportion differs from the normal constitutes error. 
As such, a second major set of analyses will be conducted; these 
analyses will involve an assessment of the impact of a reflected gamma 
distribution on the term describing predictor performance. The logic 
of a truncated normal distribution of performance may be less applica­
ble with this variable. This is largely due to the fact that data 
on predictor performance can be collected for all candidates (although 
in most circumstances, of course, only a subset of all these candidates 
are actually hired). 
The appropriate distribution for predictor performance may be 
normal, but another intuitively plausible distribution of predictor 
performance may be a distribution with some degree of negative skew. 
This may be illustrated by a simple example. Assume the predictor data 
of interest are scores from a test of general cognitive ability with 
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performance normally distributed, where the mean is 100 and standard 
deviation is 15. Although technically, if the organization had access 
to a large enough (and heterogeneous enough) sample, the observed dis­
tribution might approach normal, it is unlikely that a normal distribu­
tion would be found in actual practice. It is unlikely, for instance, 
that few (if any) candidates with scores of 70 and below would be part 
of the applicant pool. In other words, relatively few scores would 
be found at the low end of the scale, while more would probably be found 
at the high end of the scale. 
In more straight-forward terms, this means that the pool of avail­
able applicants might consist of a group of individuals dominated by 
high performers, with a progressively smaller proportion of poor per­
formers. Because this type of distribution (that is, a negatively 
skewed distribution) is difficult to specify by an exact mathematical 
function, a solution may be to use a "reflection" (that is, a mirror 
image) of a positively skewed distribution. Further, it may be useful 
to specify that the "reflected" distribution must share the same mean 
and variance as the standard normal distribution to permit more accurate 
comparison. 
This set of analyses will involve use of the probability density 
function for an appropriate distribution. In a normal distribution, 
this is equal to 
6(%) = ^  
/2ir 
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An appropriate distribution for comparison might be a reflected 
gamma distribution with mean of 0 and variance of 1. The probability 
density function for this distribution is equal to 
f (X) = ^ , X < a, a > 0, a = a^ 
Note that this term is directly analagous to selection ratio, as it 
refers to the expected standardized score of those who are actually 
selected. When interpreted in the context of selection, this may not 
appear intuitively reasonable at first glance, as most analyses of 
"utility" in this context incorporate the selection ratio itself (i.e., 
the number hired out of the total number of candidates) in some form. 
Schmidt et al. (1979) note, however, that in most situations, the num­
ber of individuals to be hired is fixed by organizational constraints 
and, hence, is not under the control of the employer. As such, it may 
be mors conceptually meaningful to use the notion of expected score, 
rather than expected percentage to be hired. Thus, rather than saying 
"we expect to hire about 50% of all applicants" it may be more accurate 
to say "we expect to hire those whose performance on the predictor is 
at or above the group mean." 
Full Model 
After a determination of the robustness of these two individual 
terms, it may be informative to examine the magnitude of error result­
ing from the use of incorrect estimates for each term. As such, 
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another analysis will involve calculating the expected error at various 
combinations of the truncated SD distributions and different selection y 
standards with a distribution of predictor performance that is negative­
ly skewed. To allow for straight-forward interpretation, the results 
will be reported in terms of expected marginal increase in standardized 
utility given different distributions of job performance and different 
selection standards. Such an analysis is important to determine the 
impact of varying selection standards given different distributions of 
criterion performance on the expected increase in standardized job per­
formance. 
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RESULTS 
In order to best understand and interpret the results, they will 
be presented separately for SD^ and <j)/p, and then for the utility func­
tion as a whole. 
SD y 
A critical first step in assessing the robustness of the SD^ term 
involves the variance (on which, of course, the standard deviation is 
based) for a nonnormal distribution. In this case, the nonnormal dis­
tribution of interest is the truncated normal distribution, as described 
above. 
The standard normal density is 
*(z) = — exp^"^ 
and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) is 
' X  
$(x) = ({)(u)du , where $(x) = 1 - $(-x) for all x > 0. 
If 
$ (x) = y , then ô(y) = x 
2 
It is thus necessary to calculate the variance of the truncated 
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normal distribution, with density 
<Î'(Ç) 
0 for X < ca 
The mean is not zero: 
E(x) = j X <j)^(x)dx = 
o f I *(2)^  
(LET • F • "" ° T' 
ca 
a r ^ $Wdu 
$(-c) 
Ç. _ a$(c) 
$(-c) $(-c) 
Similarly, 
E(x^) = 
i r 2 
.X.2 ,x. dx 
2 , , „ a ca •=' L ~ 
ca 
2 f<» 
r 2 
J u- $tu;du . 
Now J x^ $(x)dx =  -  X  4)(x) + / ({)(x)dx, so 
J *(u)du = (-u<p(u) cj)Cu)du) 
•" c 
$(  r (0 + c(j)(c) + 0(-c)) -c; 
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Since lim a 4)(a) = 0 
a-x» 
Thus 
V(X) = OF = E(X^) - (E(X))^ = A^(L +FÎ^) o2($(c))2 
(9(-c))Z 
From this, it follows that the variance of a normal distribution with 
Given this, the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) was used to cal­
culate the standard deviations of truncated noznnal distributions. (Note 
that in a standard normal distribution, this quantity equals 1; thus, 
any deviation from 1 indicates error.) The results of this analysis are 
described in Table 1, where the point of truncation refers to the spe­
cific point at which the standard normal distribution (of job performance) 
is truncated, % of employees eliminated refers to the percentage of em­
ployees who would fall below that point and, hence, would be eliminated 
2 
mean of 0 and variance of a that is truncated below at ca is 
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Table 1. The effects of distributional truncation on percentage of 
employees eliminated, SD , and error 
Point of % of employees 
truncation eliminated SD^ Error 
-4.00 00.003 1.0364 .0364 
-3.75 00.009 1.0363 .0363 
-3.50 00.020 1.0361 .0361 
-3.25 00.050 1.0356 .0356 
-3.00 00.130 1.0344 .0344 
-2.75 00.30 1.0320 .0320 
-2.50 00.62 1.0273 .0273 
-2.25 01.22 1.0186 .0186 
-2.00 02.28 1.0039 .0039 
-1.75 04.01 0.9810 -.0019 
-1.50 06.68 0.9490 -.0510 
-1.25 10.56 0.9069 -.0931 
-1.00 15.87 0.8565 -.1435 
-0.75 22.66 0.8004 -.1996 
-0.50 30.85 0.7412 -.2588 
-0.25 40.13 0.6821 -.3179 
0.00 50.00 0.6252 -.3748 
0.25 59.87 0.5718 -.4272 
0.50 69.85 0.5228 -.4772 
0.75 77.34 0.4784 -.5216 
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Table 1. continued 
Point of % of employees 
truncation eliminated SD y Error 
1.00 84.13 0.4386 -.5614 
1.25 89.44 0.4031 -.5969 
1.50 93.32 0.3716 -.6814 
1.75 95.99 0.3436 -.6564 
2.00 97.72 0.3188 -.6812 
2.25 98.78 0.2968 -.7032 
2.50 99.38 0.2771 -.7229 
2.75 99.70 0.2596 -.7404 
3.00 99.87 0.2438 -.7562 
3.25 99.94 0.2297 -.7703 
3.50 99.97 0.2170 -.7830 
3.75 99.99 0.2054 -.7946 
4.00 99.99 0.1950 -.3050 
(i.e., at a point of truncation 4 standard deviations below the mean of 
job performance, 0.003% would be eliminated for unsatisfactory per­
formance), and SDy refers to the standard deviation of performance in 
standard score units. Since in a standard normal distribution this 
equals 1, error refers to the difference between the SD^ for the trun­
cated normal distribution and 1. 
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<|)/p 
The next critical step concerns the robustness of the ({)/p term, 
which describes performance on the predictor. As such, let be gamma 
distributed with probability density function 
Since 
and 
a a-1 -az _ 
f  ( z )  =  , z > 0 ,  a  >  0  ,  a  =  a  
a 
W; " I " a 
Oz = = 1 ' 
if we let X = a - z. (where x refers to predictor performance), then 
= a - Mg = u 
ana 
2 2 1 
°x = *z = 1 
The parameter a refers to the top standardized score of those accepted. 
Consequently, is standardized; it is also negatively skewed. The 
distribution of JC will be referred to as a reflected gamma. (Note that 
equality of a specific number of parameters — here, equality of means 
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and variances — is essential for the use of this distribution as a 
location scale family, which refers to a family of distributions which 
may vary in shape but share some specified number of parameters.) Use 
of this reflected gamma distribution in particular allows us to assess 
the effect of a negatively skewed distribution of predictor performance — 
that is, a distribution where the relative density increases as predictor 
performance increases. (Note that this would be descriptive of a hiring 
procedure where better candidates have a better chance of being hired.) 
Although the means and variances of these two distributions are 
equal, the distributions have different shapes, which means that at 
given points along the baselines, a different density (i.e., proportion 
of individuals who are judged to be candidates acceptable for hire) will 
fall beyond that point. This is obvious from the following results, 
where ^  refers to the top standardized score of those accepted (i.e., 
if £ = 2, then the top standardized score of those accepted will be two 
standard deviations above the mean); NORDEN refers to the percentage 
of cases falling beyond point _a in a normal distribution, and GAMDEN 
refers to the percentage of cases falling beyond point a in a reflected 
Gamma distribution. These two distributions are graphically illustrated 
on the following page, where the dotted line indicates a normal distribu­
tion and the solid line indicates a gamma distribution. The horizontal 
axis refers to the scale of predictor performance, and the vertical 
axis refers to the density (i.e., the proportion of candidates) at a 
given point. 
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Table 2. Comparison of percentage falling above lowest acceptable stand­
ardized score in normal versus reflected gamma distributions 
a NORDEN GAMDEN 
2 02. 275 00. 710 
1.5 06. 681 01. 334 
1.0 15. 866 02. 499 
0.5 30. 854 04. 594 
0.0 50. 000 08. 298 
-0.5 69. 146 14. 649 
-1.0 84, 135 25, .079 
-1.5 93, .319 41, .135 
-2.0 97, .725 63 .277 
Combined Analyses 
While the first two sets of analyses are informative in terms of 
helping to assess the robustness of the SD^ term and the (|)/p term sepa­
rately, they are insufficient in determining the robustness of the utili­
ty function as a whole. As such, an analysis concerning the multiplica­
tive effect of these two terms (i.e., nonnormality in either or both) 
is necessary. 
The following two tables describe expected marginal utility with 
(^2 - 22) equal to 0.10. (Note that any variation in N, which is here 
set equal to one, and in the difference in validities would simply change 
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Figure 3. Normal (dotted) versus reflected Gamma- (solid) distributions 
of predictor performance (Note: Horizontal axis represents 
standardized predictor performance. Vertical axis repre­
sents the likelihood of a point on the horizontal axis) 
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all of these estimates by that factor. For example, if N was equal to 
50, then all the entries would simply be multiplied by 50.) Table 5 is 
simply the difference between Tables 3 and 4. 
The entries may be interpreted as follows. The columns refer to 
progressively more stringent requirements for hire, with ^  in column 1 
equal to -2, and ^  in column 9 equal to 2. In more straightforward 
terms, this may be understood as follows. As noted above, a^ refers to 
the top standardized score (of those accepted for hire) on the predictor. 
With ja = -2, the top standardized score is two standard deviations be­
low the mean, meaning that standards for acceptance are relatively low. 
As a increases, the organization's standards for acceptance increase 
(i.e., only those who score progressively better on the predictor will 
be accepted for hire). This table assumes that the distribution of pre­
dictor performance is normal, while the next table is based on a re­
flected gamma distribution of predictor performance. 
The rows in both tables refer to progressively more stringent stand­
ards for job performance, with (point of truncation of the normal 
distribution) equal to -4.00 in row 1 and 4.00 in row 33. This means 
that, in row i, an employee's job performance must be 4 standard devia­
tions below the mean in order for that employee to be eliminated from 
the organization, while in row 33, all employees whose performance is 
4 standard deviations above the mean or "worse" are eliminated. In 
other words, this means that in row 1, the organization's standards for 
what constitutes acceptable job performance are relatively low (i.e.. 
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an employee's performance must be considerably below the mean if that 
employee is to be dropped), while in row 33, the organization's stand­
ards for acceptable job performance are extremely high, with only those 
employees whose job performance is 4 or more standard deviations above 
the mean being retained. The entries themselves refer to the expected 
marginal (that is, per employee) increase in standardized utility. This 
represents a relatively straightforward means of assessing "utility" 
under different distributional assumptions. While it does not provide 
a monetary estimate, such an estimate may be difficult to interpret at 
this stage of exploration. In other words, before any attempts to gen­
erate dollars-and-cents estimates of the savings/profits that may accrue 
from a change in human resources practices, it is necessary to generate 
estimates which are not bound by such variable constraints as infla­
tion, costs of testing, etc. 
The estimates represent a substantial refinement over earlier ef­
forts to assess utility, such as the Taylor-Russell tables. The unique­
ness of these estimates concerns their emphasis on the effects of dif­
ferent distributions of predictor and criterion performance. IJhile the 
underlying mathematics are somewhat imposing by conventional professional 
standards, they are critical in accurately assessing the stability of 
the utility function in terms of potential departures from theoretical 
assumptions and, hence, are an important step on the road to accounta­
bility in human resources cost accounting. 
Table 3. Increase in marginal standardized job performance with a 
normal distribution of predictor performance and increasing 
truncation of job performance^ 
a 
C 
-2 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 
-4.0 0.246 0.201 0.158 0.118 
-3.75 0.246 0.201 0.158 0.118 
-3.50 0.246 0.201 0.158 0.118 
-3.25 0.246 0.201 0.158 0.118 
-3.00 0.246 0.201 0.158 0.118 
-2.75 0.245 0.200 0.157 0.113 
-2.50 0.244 0.199 0.157 0.117 
-2.25 0.242 0.197 0.155 0.116 
-2.00 0.238 0.194 0.153 0.115 
-1.75 0.233 0.190 0.150 0.112 
-1.50 0.225 0.184 0.145 0.108 
-1.25 0.215 0.176 0.138 0.103 
-1.00 0.203 0.166 0.131 0.098 
-0.75 0.190 0.155 0.122 0.091 
-0.50 0.176 0.144 0.113 0.085 
-0.25 0.162 0.132 0.104 0.078 
0.00 0.148 0.121 0.095 0.071 
0.25 0.136 0.111 0.087 0.065 
0.50 0.124 0.101 0.079 0.060 
0.75 0.114 0.093 0.073 0.055 
1.00 0.104 0.085 0.067 0.050 
1.25 0.096 0.078 0.061 0.046 
1.50 0.088 0.072 0.057 0.042 
1.75 0.082 0.067 0.052 0.039 
2.00 0.076 0.062 0.049 0.036 
2.25 0.070 0.058 0.045 0.034 
2.50 0.066 0.054 0.042 0.032 
2.75 0.062 0.050 0.040 0.030 
3.00 0.058 0.047 0.037 0.028 
3.25 0.055 0.045 0.035 0.026 
3.50 0.051 0.042 0.033 0.025 
3.75 0.049 0.040 0.031 0.023 
4.00 0.046 0.038 0.030 0.022 
^The variable a represents expected top standardized score of pre­
dictor performance given that predictor performance is normally dis­
tributed. The variable C represents the point at which the normal 
distribution of job performance is truncated. 
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0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 
0.083 0.053 0.030 0.014 0.006 
0.083 0.053 0.030 0.014 0.006 
0,083 0.053 0.030 0.014 0.006 
0.083 0.053 0.030 0.014 0.006 
0.083 0.053 0,030 0.014 0.006 
0.082 0.053 0.030 0.014 0.006 
0.082 0.052 0.030 0.014 0.006 
0.082 0.052 0.029 0.014 0.006 
0.081 0.052 0.029 0.014 0.006 
0.078 0.050 0.028 0.014 0.005 
0.076 0.048 0.027 0.013 0.005 
0.072 0.046 0.026 0.013 0.005 
0.068 0.043 0.025 0.012 0.005 
0.064 0.041 0.023 0.011 0.004 
0.059 0.038 0.021 0.010 0.004 
0.054 0.035 0.020 0.009 0.004 
0.050 0.032 0.018 0.009 0.003 
0.047 0.029 0.016 0.008 0.003 
0.042 0.027 0.015 0.007 0.003 
0.038 0.024 0,014 0.007 0.003 
0.035 0.022 0.013 0.006 0.002 
0.032 0.021 0.012 0.006 0.002 
0.030 0.019 0.011 0.005 0.002 
0.027 0.017 0.010 0.005 0.002 
0.025 0.016 0.009 0.004 0.002 
0.024 0.015 0.009 0.004 0.002 
0.022 0.014 0.008 0.004 0.002 
0.021 0.013 0.007 0.004 0.001 
0,019 0-012 0.007 0.003 0.001 
0.018 0.012 0.007 0.003 0.001 
0,017 0.011 0.006 0.003 0,001 
0.016 0.011 0,006 0.003 0.001 
0.016 0.010 0.006 0,003 0.001 
Table 4. Increase In marginal standardized job performance with a 
reflected gamma distribution of predictor performance and 
increasing truncation of job performance^ 
a —2.0 —1.3 —1.0 —0.5 
C 
-4.0 0.080 0.081 0.082 0.082 
-3.75 0.080 0.081 0.082 0.082 
-3.50 0.080 0.081 0.082 0.082 
-3.25 0.080 0.081 0.082 0.082 
-3.00 0.080 0.081 0.082 0.082 
-2.75 0.080 0.081 0.081 0.082 
-2.50 0.079 0.080 0.081 0.082 
-2.25 0.079 0.080 0.080 0.081 
-2.00 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.080 
-1.75 0.076 0.077 0.077 0.078 
-1.50 0.073 0.074 0.075 0.075 
-1.25 0.070 0.071 0.071 0.072 
-1.00 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.068 
-0.75 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.064 
-0.50 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.059 
-0.25 0.053 0.053 0.054 0.054 
0.00 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.050 
0.25 0.044 0.045 0.045 0.045 
0.50 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.042 
0.75 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.038 
1.00 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.035 
1.25 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.032 
1.50 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.030 
1.75 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 
2.00 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 
2.25 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.024 
2.50 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 
2.75 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021 
3.00 0.019 0.019. 0.019 0.019 
3.25 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
3.50 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
3.75 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
4.00 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
^The variable a represents expected top standardized score of 
predictor performance is distributed as reflected gamma. The variable 
C represents the point at which the normal distribution of job per­
formance is truncated. 
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0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 
0.083 0.083 0.082 0.079 0.073 
0.083 0.083 0.082 0.079 0.073 
0.083 0.083 0.082 0.079 0.073 
0.083 0.083 0.082 0.079 0.073 
0.083 0.082 0.082 0.079 0.073 
0.082 0.082 0.081 0.079 0.072 
0.082 0.082 0.081 0.078 0.072 
0.081 0.081 0.080 0.078 0.071 
0.080 0.080 0.079 0.077 0.070 
0.078 0.078 0.077 0.075 0.069 
0.076 0.076 0.075 0.072 0.067 
0.072 0.072 0.072 0.069 0.064 
0.068 0.068 0.068 0.065 0.060 
0.064 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.056 
0.059 0.059 0.058 0.057 0.052 
0.054 0.054 0.054 0.052 0.048 
0.050 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.044 
0.046 0.046 0.045 0.044 0.040 
0.042 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.037 
0.038 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.034 
0.035 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.031 
0.032 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.028 
0.030 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.026 
0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.024 
C • 025 C. 025 0.024 0 = 022 
0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.021 
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.019 
0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.018 
0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.017 
G. OIS 0.018 G. OIS 0.018 0.016 
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 
0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.014 
0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014 
Table 5. Absolute marginal error in the use of the theoretical normal 
versus the empirical reflected gamma distribution^ 
a 
C 
-2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 
-4.00 -0.166 -0.120 -0.076 -0.036 
-3.75 -0.166 -0.120 -0.076 -0.036 
-3.50 -0.166 -0.120 -0.076 -0.036 
-3.25 -0.166 -0.120 -0.076 -0.036 
-3.00 -0.165 -0.120 -0.076 -0.036 
-2.75 -0.165 -0.119 -0.076 -0.036 
-2.50 -0.164 -0.119 -0.076 -0.036 
-2.25 -0.163 -0.118 -0.075 -0.035 
-2.00 -0.160 -0.116 -0.074 -0.035 
-1.75 -0.157 -0.113 -0.072 -0.034 
-1.50 -0.152 -0.110 -0.070 -0.033 
-1.25 -0.145 -0.105 -0.067 -0.031 
-1.00 -0.137 -0.099 -0.063 -0.030 
-0.75 -0.128 -0.093 -0.059 -0.028 
-0.50 -0.119 —0.086 -0.055 -0.026 
-0.25 -0.109 -0.079 -0.050 -0.024 
0.00 -0.100 -0.072 —0.046 -0.021 
0.25 -0.091 —0.066 -0.042 -0.020 
0.50 —0.084 -0.061 -0.039 -0.018 
0.75 -0.077 -0.055 -0.035 -0.017 
1.00 -0.070 -0.051 -0.032 -0.015 
1.25 -0.064 -0.047 -0.030 -0.014 
1.50 -0.059 -0.043 -0.027 -0.013 
1.75 -0.055 -0.040 -0.025 -0.012 
2.00 -0.051 -0.037 -0.023 -0.011 
2.25 -0.047 -0.034 -0.022 -0.010 
2.50 -0.044 -0.032 -0.020 -0.010 
2.75 -0.042 -0.030 -0.019 -0.009 
3.00 -0.039 -0.028 -0.018 -0.008 
3.25 -0.037 -0.027 -0.017 -0.008 
3.50 -0.035 -0.025 -0.016 -0.008 
3.75 -0.033 -0.024 -0.015 -0.007 
4.00 -0.031 -0.023 -0.014 -0.006 
^(**** indicates that the difference was <0.00 and, hence, is not 
reported.) The variable a refers to the expected top standardized 
score of predictor performance given that predictor performance is dis­
tributed as a reflected gamma. The variable C represents the point of 
which the normal distribution of job performance is truncated. 
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DISCUSSION 
In order to understand the importance of the foregoing analyses, 
it is necessary to examine the two most important variables — SD^ and 
ç/p — separately, before considering the implications of the results 
in terms of the applicability of the function as a whole. Because all 
other terms in the function (such as N, and C^, and the r^ - ^ 2 dif­
ference) are simply multiplicative factors, these two terms are ob­
viously most critical in terms of assessing the function's robustness, 
and, hence, are essential as a first step in determining the tenability 
of its use in an applied setting. 
Statistical implications 
As noted above, SD^ is intended to reflect/describe the distribu­
tion of job performance in the organization. Before discussing more 
specific implications of this term in an organizational context, however, 
it may be useful to consider the importance of the standard deviation 
in a statistical sense. 
In precise statistical terms, the standard deviation is a measure 
of spread or dispersion of scores around the average, or most typical 
score — in other words, a term frequently used in descriptive statistics 
to help describe the relative amount of variability in a particular dis­
tribution of scores. Mathematically, it is the square root of the vari­
ance, where the variance is equal to 
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n _ « 
Z (y. - y) 
i=l ^ 
n — 1 
for "small" a (i.e., less than 30) and 
° 2 
z (y. - M) 
i=l ^ 
n 
for "large" n. 
The variance is a "unit-bound" measure of variability. This means 
that unless the distribution of interest has been standardized (that is, 
converted to a scale where the arithmetic mean is equal to 0 and the 
variance is equal to 1), the SD^ cannot be interpreted without reference 
to the particular scale used in the underlying distribution, as the 
significance of any particular standard deviation can be evaluated only 
in terms of its relationship to the distribution being used. This, again, 
is the rationale for expressing the SD^ in standard score units as a more 
precise measure of the absolute, or cardinal (rather than relative, or 
ordinal) utility expected to result from a particular decision. This 
kind of approach will allow an estimate of SD that is not unit-bound and, 
hence, can be interpreted without reference to some arbitrary scale of 
pay. 
The meaning of SD^ can best be understood by careful examination 
of the deviation-score formula: 
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2 
z (y. - u) 
1=1 ^ 
n 
Obviously, the SD^ reflects the amount of variation or "spread" around 
the mean (i.e., the most typical) score. In terms of job performance, 
it refers to the dispersion of performance (for a group) around average 
performande. As noted above, a number of classic referents (i.e., 
Munsterberg, 1914; Hull, 1928) had pointed out that performance within 
a particular job will vary across people. This reflects the obvious 
fact that merely determining the average, or most typical, level of job 
performance is insufficient to accurately describe the performance of 
the employee group as a whole. 
The most extreme case investigated here (mainly for purposes of 
comparison) concerns the rectangular distribution, also known as the 
distribution of constant density. In statistical terms, this refers to 
a density of the function 
p(x) = Y ifb--ra<x<b+-|-a 
0 otherwise 
in more general terms, this means that the same proportion of employees 
would be found at every level of job performance, rather than a larger 
proportion at or near the mean, with the frequency decreasing at points 
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further above and below the mean. The SD^ for a standardized rectangu­
lar distribution Cas calculated by Schmidt et al.'s global estimation 
technique) differs from by approximately 25%. 
Note that, technically speaking, the distribution of constant den­
sity does not represent the most extreme departure from a normal distri­
bution that is possible; this would be the case with an inverted U-shaped 
distribution, more precisely called a hyperbolic distribution. However, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a real-life situation 
where the distribution of job performance could be appropriately described 
as hyperbolic, as this would be analogous to assuming that the smallest 
proportion of workers fell at a point describing average job performance, 
with increasingly larger proportions at points further above and below 
the mean (i.e., more "excellent" and "poor" workers than "average" 
workers. Because it is so unlikely that such a distribution would be 
found in an actual organizational setting, it was felt that investiga­
tion of the impact of this type of distribution on estimates of SD^ would 
have relatively little meaning, in either conceptual or practical terms. 
The utility function assumes that the distribution of job performance 
is approximately normal. (Although Schmidt at al., 1979, argus that 
this assumption is largely for derivational purposes, an inspection of 
the distributional assumptions used in every investigation of the use of 
utility function in human resources indicates that the assumption of 
normality is widely accepted.) In statistical terms, this means that 
the distribution is roughly equal to 0, where $ refers to the density 
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function of the normal distribution 
p(x) = — exp^"^ 
In more general terms, this means that not only is the distribution 
of performance symmetrical (i.e., there are as many performers below the 
mean as above, and the performance of the best employees is "balanced" 
by that of the worst), but that a fixed and predictable proportion of 
individuals falls into specific intervals of the distribution. For ex­
ample, the distribution could accurately be described in terms of stand­
ard deviations by virtue of the fact that roughly 58% of the population 
is within 1 standard deviation of the mean. In other words, if the dis­
tribution of job performance is approximately normal, roughly 34% of the 
population will be within 1 standard deviation above the mean, and rough­
ly 34% will be within 1 standard deviation below the mean. As performance 
moves in either direction away from the mean, fewer and fewer employees 
will fall at these increasingly more extreme points of job performance. 
If job performance in an organization actually is normally dis­
tributed, 0 = O where a refers to the standard deviation of the normal 
ne n 
distribution and refers to the standard deviation of the empirical 
distribution. However, in most real-life situations, organizational 
constraints preclude a truly symmetrical distribution of performance. 
It is simply not tenable to imagine that all performers, even the very 
poorest, will remain with the organization; typically, the organization 
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is forced to jettison such employees for their failure to contribute to 
the attainment of organizational goals. 
Note that, according to Lehman (1975), the distribution of measure­
ments taken under sufficiently well-controlled conditions is often ap­
proximately normal; thus, this observation is reasonable in many organi­
zational settings. Lehman also points out, however, that while it was 
formerly believed that the normal distribution is practically universal 
as a distribution of measurements, it has since been determined that this 
tends to be true only for the central part of the distribution, with the 
tails often being distorted by mistakes in measurement or other excep­
tional circumstances — so-called gross errors. The implication is 
that the normal distribution may not necessarily be the most accurate 
description of the empirical distribution. 
Young and Veldman (1977) note that if a distribution is highly 
skewed, the variance (and, hence, the standard deviation) is not the 
best measure of variability, largely because scores are squared in the 
computation of the variance. This means that extreme scores are weighted 
much more heavily than are scores near the mean. The overall effect 
would be a marked (and possibly misleading) increase in the observed 
standard deviation due to relatively few extreme scores. Young and 
Veldman contend that the semi-interquartile range, which is defined as 
half the distance between the point below which 25% of the observations 
and the point below which 75% of the observations fall, is the pre­
ferred measure of variability in a skewed distribution. Since the 
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values of the extreme observations have little effect on the semi-inter-
quartile range, it is more appropriate than the variance in a highly-
skewed distribution. 
In statistical terms, a finding more realistic than a normal dis­
tribution might be a truncated normal distribution, with some propor­
tion of the left tail cut off Cthe specific point of truncation being 
determined, obviously, by the organization's standards for job per­
formance). Statistically speaking, this is referred to as a skewed 
distribution; if some portion of the left tail (i.e., the portion below 
the mean) is cut off, the skew is described as positive, because the 
"tail" (more precisely, the long part of the distribution) points towards 
the high, or positive end of the scale of job performance. 
When described in terms of skewness, this type of distribution may 
seem conceptually illogical at first glance, because it appears that 
there are more employees clustered at the low end of the performance 
scale, with the relative proportion of employees falling off at higher 
levels of job performance. In other words, it may appear that a larger 
proportion of employees perform at a relatively lower level, compared to 
the proportion who are performing at a relatively high level. It must 
be kept in mind, however, that even job performance at the extreme left 
of the truncated normal distribution (i.e., at the low end of the per­
formance scale) represents performance deemed acceptable by the organi­
zation's standards. There is, thus, a pile-up of scores on the low end 
of this modified scale, but the pile-up involves a scale on which all 
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performance is at least minimally acceptable. 
From a statistical perspective, it is necessary to first examine 
the effects of this truncation on where = the standard deviation 
of the truncated normal distribution as estimated by the Schmidt et al. 
(1979) global estimation technique. In terms of computational clarity, 
SDy is equal to (85^ - 15^)/2, where 85^ refers to performance at the 
85th percentile, and 15^ refers to performance at the 15th percentile. 
In a standard normal distribution, this quantity would obviously be 
equal to 1. 
Substantive implications 
In more general terms, this can be understood as follows. Assume 
that if an organization was able to retain all those initially hired, 
the resulting distribution of job performance would, indeed, be ap­
proximately normal. However Cas noted above), in terms of organization­
al effectiveness, it is reasonable to assume that extremely poor job 
performance is detrimental to the attainment of organizational objectives. 
It is, therefore, logical to assume that there would exist some minimum 
cut-off point, meaning that at some point, job performance would no 
longer be considered acceptable, and all individuals whose job performance 
fell below that point would be terminated. This minimum cut-off point 
would, thus, cause a truncation of the normal distribution because some 
portion of the left tail (the specific portion depending, obviously, on 
the exact placement of the cut—off point), would drop out of the distribu­
tion. If the cut—off point was placed far below the mean of job per­
formance, only a very small portion of the employees would be eliminated. 
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and the resulting distribution of job performance would largely re­
semble a normal distribution. However, as the cut-off point was moved 
up the scale of job performance (meaning that as the minimm standard 
for "acceptable" job performance was made more stringent), the distribu­
tion would become increasingly more truncated and decreasingly like the 
normal distribution. 
Conceptually, it is logical to assume that as the range of job 
performance varies from a normal distribution, so too would the esti­
mate of SD differ from 1. As is obvious from the results described y 
above, this is, indeed, what happens. IJhen the cut-off point is set at 
a point approximately two standard deviations below the mean, the effect 
on (i.e., in comparison to a^) is negligible. This is equivalent 
to eliminating roughly the lowest 2.5% of the total employee population. 
As the cut-off is set at progressively higher points (i.e., moved up the 
scale of job perfoinaance towards the mean), the impact on (again, 
as compared to a^) becomes progressively more significant. At a point 
two standard deviations below the mean, differs from by a factor 
of less than one percent, while at a point one-half standard deviation 
below the mean, it differs by 25%. (As noted above, SD^ as estimated by 
this approach should be approximately equal to 1; any deviation from 1, 
either over or under, indicates the presence of error.) 
Careful inspection of the results for SD^ with a truncated normal 
distribution indicates that at relatively small deviations from the 
normal distribution, very little error in the estimation of SD is in­
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volved. Between = -4 and = -1.65, the magnitude of error Cin terms 
of the truncated normal distribution as compared to the normal distribu­
tion) is ± 3%. At extreme points of truncation, however, the magnitude 
of error becomes considerably more pronounced. 
Also, note that at very extreme mpoints of truncation (i.e., at 
or above the mean), the impact on SD^ is quite substantial; however, 
this is analogous to the elimination of those whose job performance is 
average (or possibly even those whose performance is above average, de­
pending on the location of the truncation point) and, thus, would not 
be a very realistic occurrence in most organizational settings. 
Note that these manipulations are largely numerical in nature and 
are based on the admittedly somewhat tenuous assumption that supervisors 
can accurately assess SD^ themselves. In other words, the discrepancies 
pointed out here involve discrepancies between accurate estimates of 
SDy (as calculated by the global estimation technique) when the under­
lying distribution actually is normal and the same quantity when the 
distribution is not precisely normal. 
Another major potential source of error, besides the objective 
error present in using an improper distribution of job performance (i.e.. 
assuming that the distribution in question is truly normal when, in fact, 
it is a truncated normal) concerns the degree to which supervisors really 
can make accurate estimates of SD^. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) argue that 
the limitations of human introspection preclude an accurate examination 
of thought processes. In other words, they contend that people general­
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ly are not capable of describing, with, any degree of accuracy, how or 
why they reached a particular decision. In the context of this inves­
tigation, it may be difficult to determine if supervisors can make ac­
curate estimates of that are based on actual job performance. In­
vestigation of this type of error in the context of this study, however, 
would involve an analysis of the degree to which supervisors as subjects 
can accurately report on their own decision-making processes (i.e., 
what factors or cues they use in evaluating the performance of employees 
in monetary terms) and, hence, is beyond the scope of this study. 
These results provide at least minimal evidence that the SD^ term 
is relatively robust, and, hence, have important implications for the 
use of the utility function in practical settings. Note that a number 
of authors (Schmidt et al., 1979; Boudreau, 1983b; Landy & Farr, 1983) 
have contended that a major obstacle to widespread use of the utility 
function as a means of analyzing cost—benefit ratios of human resources 
practices concerns the presumed difficulty of estimating SD^, the stand­
ard deviation of performance. Given the results of the first set of 
analyses, it appears that the SC^ as determined by the global estimation 
technique is at least somewhat impervious to departures from normality 
in terms of the actual distribution of job performance. Further, if 
an organization has some cognizance of their performance standards and 
the resulting impact of such standards on the distribution of job per­
formance, they may be able to account for at least some departures from 
normality in estimates of SD (and, therefore, in estimates of AU). y 
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Statistical implications 
The second major variable of interest is 4Vp, where ^ refers 
to the height of the normal curve at point In more general terms, 
it refers to the expected score (on the predictor) of those who 
are accepted. It would be very unusual for an organization to accept 
all available candidates for hire; more typically some minimum predictor 
score is established and only those whose performance on the predictor 
meets or exceeds that are accepted for hire (given, of course, 
that the exact number to be hired is determined by organizational con­
straints). If the performance on the predictor was, indeed, normally 
distributed, then in a standardized distribution, the mean is equal to 
0 and the standard deviation is equal to 1, and there would be a fixed 
and predictable proportion of candidates falling above any arbitrary 
predictor score. However, consider what happens when we take into ac­
count the fact that not all candidates are hired; and that the true dis­
tribution of predictor performance is not normal. As noted above, a 
conceptually plausible distribution of predictor performance is a re­
flected gamma (F), where the density is specified by 
a a-l -az 2 
f(z) = ^ , z > 0, z > 0, a = a 
This means that 
u = — = a, and 
7^. a 
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(Note that equality of some number of parameters — here, equality 
of mean and variance — is essential for the use of this distribution 
as a location scale family, which refers to a family of distributions 
which may vary in shape but share some number of parameters.) 
As noted above, this means that the top standardized score is a^. 
Consider the meaning of .a in this context. As we set the minimum ac­
ceptable predictor score at progressively higher points, the difference 
between the maximum score and the mean score will of necessity decrease. 
(Consider, for example, a test with a possible total of 100 points. If 
50 is designated as the cut-off for acceptable performance, selectees 
may fall anywhere in the interval from 50 to 100. If, however, 75 is 
designated as the cut-off, acceptable candidates may fall only between 
75 and 100.) This works to narrow the range of acceptable scores and 
makes the empirical distribution progressively more different than the 
theoretical distribution. 
Note that practical constraints may preclude a distribution of 
predictor performance that is exactly analogous to the normal distribu­
tion. This is because measurement devices may not be designed to account 
for performance at all points in the interval ± infinity. However, given 
that ± 2 standard deviations includes mere than 95% of the total dis­
tribution, this range is almost certainly acceptable for most applica­
tions. 
77 
Substantive implications 
The implications of these analyses for usage of the model are as 
follows. When an organization is determining some minimum acceptable 
level of predictor performance, it is critical to consider the impact 
of the ())/p term on utility estimates. (Note that this term is direct­
ly analogous to selection ratio, because as standards for acceptable 
predictor performance increases, the selection ratio will of necessity 
decrease, except under the highly unlikely condition that there is no 
variability in terms of predictor performance among the available candi­
dates. To restate this in more meaningful terms, as the organization 
becomes more selective — that is, sets the minimum cut-off for accept 
versus reject at a higher point — the number and the proportion of 
candidates who will be considered acceptable for hire will almost cer­
tainly decrease.) 
The degree of error can be graphically illustrated by examining 
the difference between the graphs GAMDEN and NORDEN in Figure 3. 
It can be more precisely determined by examining the difference in den­
sity at any particular point as illustrated in Table 2. If, for example, 
we examine the relative densities at a point where ^  = 1, it is obvious 
that there is a considerable amount of discrepancy between the two. 
Note that this is to be expected given the difference in shape between 
the two distributions. Even at a point where a^ = 2, however, the two 
densities differ markedly. If it is assumed that the distribution of 
predictor performance is normal, then the density at the point where 
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a = 1 would be assumed to be 15.8669; the corresponding density in a re­
flected gamma distribution is 2.49990. The "error" is not precisely 
in the use of the normal distribution versus the reflected gamma dis­
tribution; rather, it is in the use of the d)/p term in the model. If 
performance is normally distributed, then (j)/p (where ^/p reflects the 
height of the normal curve at point 2 and, hence, describes a certain 
portion of individuals beyond £) is correct. However, if the distribu­
tion is actually a reflected gamma shape (though still having a mean of 
0 and a standard deviation of 1), the error will occur in terms of the 
proportion of candidates expected to fall beyond 2-
At very low selection rates (i.e., where the organization has es­
tablished a relatively high cut-off for predictor performance), the im­
pact in terms of error may be substantial. At higher selection rates, 
however, the impact becomes progressively less (although there will 
always be some amount of error present unless the organization hires all 
available candidates). 
Schmidt et al. (1979) point out that in most situations, the number 
of candidates to be hired is fixed by organizational constraints. The 
selection ratio is largely determined by circumstances and is not under 
the control of the ençloyer. In circumstances where the applicant pool 
is roughly constant, any statements concerning "optimal" selection ratios 
have little practical value, since the selection ratio is not under the 
control of the employer. For this reason, it is more intuitively meaning­
ful to discuss selection in terms of expected score than in terms of per­
centage of applicants hired. 
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General Implications 
While the statistical machinations are of some interest, the most 
important implications concern the overall impact of different distribu­
tions of predictor performance and job performance on AU. Because the 
utility function is multiplicative, any error in the estimation of 
various components would cause the resulting estimation of AU to be in 
error by that percentage. In the case of the above analyses, an inter­
esting pattern of results is found. 
The magnitude of error can be ascertained by an examination of 
Table 5, which represents the difference between the marginal increase 
in utility under the parameters of the reflected gamma distribution 
(as shown in Table 4), and the same increase in utility under the as­
sumptions of the normal distribution (as shown in Table 3). A more 
straight-forward way to interpret these results is as the difference 
between what is actually true (the reflected gamma distribution) and 
what the decision-maker believes to be true (the normal distribution), 
When this difference is negative, this means that the decision-maker's 
estimate of AU is too large (i.e., the actual increase in marginal 
utility is smaller than what is assumed by the decision-maker). When 
this difference is positive, the decision-maker's estimate of AU is 
too small (i.e., relative to the actual increase in marginal utility 
that would occur). 
An inspection of Table 5 indicates that neither the direction nor 
the magnitude of error is constant across various combinations of as­
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sumptions. In terms of magnitude, the largest errors occur at high 
selection ratios Ci.e., where a, the expected score on the predictor of 
those hired, is relatively low) and low points of truncation of job 
performance (i.e., where the organization's standard for what consti­
tutes acceptable able job performance is relatively low and, hence, 
serves to eliminate only a very small portion of the employees). 
For exasqile, in Table 5, row 1, column 1, the error is -0.166. 
As increases (that is, as the organization's standards for acceptable 
job performance increase), the difference decreases. The smallest 
amount of error is obviously in the opposite half of the matrix, where 
the organization has very high standards for acceptance and for job per­
formance, meaning that the expected score for those hired is high and 
the standard for what constitutes acceptable job performance is also 
high. 
In terms of the direction of error, the differences are negative 
(meaning that the decision-maker has overestimated the expected gain 
in marginal utility) until column 5 (where ^  = 0, meaning that the 
top standardized score on the predictor is zero). In this column, the 
differences are so small as to essentially equal zero. As a^ increases 
(columns 6, 7, 8, and 9), the amount of error tends to increase somewhat, 
although the error is now positive (meaning that the decision-maker 
could be underestimating the utility of the proposed change). 
Intuitively, these findings may be understood as follows. When ^  
is low, the top standard score of those accepted is low; thus, the 
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organization does not have high standards for the expected quality of 
those accepted. When is low, the point of truncation for acceptable 
versus unacceptable job performance is low, meaning that the organiza­
tion does not have high standards for what constitutes acceptable job 
performance. It is, thus, understandable that, given low standards 
for selection and for "good" job performance, a comparatively large 
amount of overestimation occurs. In other words, it may appear to the 
decision-maker that considerably more utility is expected than would 
actually accrue; however, this may be due largely to very lax job stand­
ards. In the opposite situation, where standards for both acceptance 
into the organization and acceptable job performance are high, the de­
cision-maker may tend to underestimate potential gains. (Note that, 
although the gains themselves are smaller, this is due to the fact that 
at very high standards, performance is already quite high; thus, it is 
to be expected that there is some ceiling on performance and, hence, on 
expected utility — i.e., on the amount that standardized job performance 
can be expected to increase.) 
In essence, the types of errors possible are not symmetrical and 
obviously depend largely on existing conditions in the organization. 
If standards for both selection and continued tenure are relatively 
low (i.e., the organization has a high selection ratio and a low stand­
ard for what constitutes "acceptable" job performance), the relative 
gains in standardized marginal utility (where utility refers, again, 
to the expected increase in marginal standardized job performance) may 
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appear quite substantial. If the organization has high standards for 
acceptance (i.e., hire) and for acceptable job performance, such rela­
tive gains may appear modest. This seemingly paradoxical finding is due 
to the importance of the base rate of job performance. If standards 
for selection and retention are low, the base rate of performance is 
low; hence, there is a good deal of room for improvement in terms of 
expected marginal increase in standardized job performance. If stand­
ards for selection are high and job performance is already relatively 
high, then gains (relative to average current job performance) may be 
smaller. (Note, however, that the expected average level of job per­
formance may still be higher even if the expected gains themselves are 
relatively small.) 
The logic of whether underestimation or overestimation occurs may 
appear counter-intuitive at first, because if actual gains in utility 
are smaller than estimated gains, the result is overestimation of 
utility, not underestimation. The explanation, however, is as follows. 
The use of the Schmidt et al. (1979) application assumes that the dis­
tributions of both predictor performance and job performance are normal. 
In terms of the global estimation technique, this means that super­
visors are estimating SD^ as if the distribution is normal; hence, the 
standardized SD^ is equal to 1. If, however, the true distribution of 
job performance is not normal, the appropriate variance (and, hence, the 
appropriate standard deviation) for a truncated normal distribution is 
less; thus, the empirical standard deviation is less. In other words. 
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supervisors may be estimating SD^ as if the empirical distribution is 
normal when it is actually a truncated normal distribution. Note again 
that the impact of AU is negligible at cut-off points that are far be­
low the mean of job performance. Similar logic may apply to the (j)/p 
term. If the distribution of predictor performance is assumed to be 
normal when it is actually more similar to a reflected gamma distribu­
tion, the proportion of individuals expected to meet or exceed the mini­
mum predictor cut-off is generally smaller than anticipated. 
It is critical, however, for the organization to have at least a 
rough idea of the shape of the performance distribution (for both pre­
dictor performance and job performance). This caveat stems from an in­
spection of Tchebysheff's theorem: 
Given a number k > 1 and a set of n measurements, 
at least (k - l)/k of the measurements will lie 
within ^  standard deviations of their mean. 
For example, if n = 30 and k = 3, then 
k — 1 = 2. and 
k - 1 so at least 2/3 of the measurements will lie within 
3 3 standard deviations of the mean; thus, at least 20 
observations will lie within the interval ± 3 stand­
ard deviations. 
Though this was originally intended as a description of the variability 
of a normal distribution, it has also been found to describe, reasonably 
well, the variability of other mound-shaped distributions. (Note that 
Mendenhall, 1983, points out that mound-shaped and bell-shaped distribu­
tions occur frequently in nature and, hence, Tchebysheff's theorem is 
widely applicable.) Also, Tchebysheff's theorem gives a lower bound 
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as an estimate of the fraction of measurements falling within the 
specified interval. 
The implications of these analyses for implementation of the model 
in human resources functions will depend, obviously, on value judgments 
which must be regarded as somewhat arbitrary in nature. This concept 
may be analyzed with respect to two important concepts: First, how 
does the organization plan to use the results of a particular utility 
analysis for decision making? For example, will a utility analysis be 
conducted to determine whether or not a different type of selection 
should be used to result in better average job performance? Similarly, 
the organization may wish to estimate the expected gains in job per­
formance that may accrue from the implementation of a different type of 
training program. Secondly, how can the magnitude of error be assessed 
in terms of the ramifications for the organization? 
Note that two completely different types of error are possible. 
The organization may decide against a change when they should have de­
cided in favor of the change. Conversely, they may decide in favor of 
a change when no such change was in fact warranted. For example, they 
may decide, on the basis of a utility analysis, that a different 
selection procedure would result in a substantial improvement in job 
performance. If the assumptions underlying utility theory are not met, 
however, these estimates of the expected increase in job performance 
(expressed in standard score units or in monetary terms) indicate 
more utility than would actually accrue is to be expected. 
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Conversely, the organization might decide, on the basis of another 
utility analysis, that a proposed change in their selection system or 
training program would not be warranted, given the apparent expected 
gain in utility (i.e., increase in job performance). If their estimates 
of the expected utility are underestimates, this is obviously an incor­
rect decision. The type of error that is preferable is, of course, 
largely a question of value system. For example, would the decision­
maker prefer to forego potential monetary benefits or overestimate po­
tential monetary benefits? 
The type of error that is more likely is obviously a question of 
whether under- or overestimation has occurred. If the error is (un­
beknownst to the organization) on the side of conservatism, the organi­
zation may view the utility expected to result from the proposed change 
with some caution or even pesssimism, because it may appear that the 
monetary benefits predicted to result from change are modest or even 
negligible. This may dissuade the organization from implementing change 
when doing so would actually result in larger monetary benefits than 
expected, thus, depriving them of significant potential gains. 
The other type of error may be as serious; this is the error of 
overestimating potential monetary benefits. It may appear in certain 
cases that implementing a particular change in human resources functions 
will result in substantial monetary benefits when, in fact, such bene­
fits would not be realized. The organization may, thus, decide to 
implement a change in human resources based on an overly optimistic 
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estimate of the expected potential benefits. 
In terms of the implications for implementation of this as a cost-
benefit approach, these results provide some reason for, at minimum, 
cautious optimism. It appears that some amount of deviation from a 
normal distribution of job performance has only a negligible impact on 
the SDy. It is possible to eliminate as much as 11% of the workforce 
(the lowest 11%) and have only 10% error. Cutting at the mean of the 
job performance results in an error of over 37%, which would almost 
certainly be considered too large. However, it is reasonable to argue 
that this situation is highly unlikely in actual practice, as it would 
be the case only if the organization terminated everyone whose per­
formance fell below the overall mean. Furthermore, as noted above, 
if the organization has some cognizance of the impact of their per­
formance standards on the resulting distribution of job performance, 
they may be able to take this into consideration when estimating SD^. 
An important caveat here concerns the obvious fact that different 
assumptions result in different estimates of It may be unclear 
exactly which estimate is preferable and, indeed, if only a single 
estimate is used, the likelihood of an inaccurate estimate (and. hence 
a potentially incorrect decision) may increase. 
An alternative to assuming that there is one "correct" estimate 
for AU (that is, for a proposed decision) and, thus, relying on only a 
single estimate as the sole criterion of acceptability of a proposed 
decision is to use at least two different estimates, each based on 
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different assumptions Ci.e., in terms of the SD^ and <j)/p variables). 
This will provide the organization, in general, and the decision-makers, 
in particular, with a range of estimates with which to work. Thus, in­
stead of simplistically assuming that there is a single "best" estimate 
of the utility to be gained from a particular personnel decision, it 
may be more informative to employ estimates of the minimum and maximum 
utility that might reasonably be expected to result from the decision 
in question. This may also help to decrease the probability of an error 
in decision-making, because the decision will obviously be based on more 
than one estimate. 
Schmidt et al. (1979) point out that, although appropriate utility 
equations have been available since 1949, psychologists have still been 
notably slow in carrying out decision-theoretic utility analyses of human 
resources procedures. This, they contend, may be due largely to three 
reasons : 
- many psychologists believe that the utility equations 
are virtually useless unless available data exactly fit 
the linear homoscedastic model and all distributions are 
normal; 
- psychologists once believed that validity was situational-
ly specific and subtle differences in the performance re­
quirements of jobs from situation to situation produce non-
trivial differences in validities. If this is so, then 
the results of a utility analysis conducted in one particu­
lar setting could not be generalized to seemingly identical 
test-job combinations in other settings; 
- it is considered very difficult in many cases to obtain all 
the information called for in the equations. Selection 
ratio, number tested, and cost of testing can be determined 
with reasonable accuracy and at very little cost. The SD , 
however, has been regarded as difficult to obtain, as it 
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is generally assumed that it can be estimated only through 
the use of costly and complicated cost-accounting methods. 
Schmidt et al. determined that SD^ may be estimated in a relatively 
straight-forward and sinçle way. Their conclusions, taken together 
with the results of these analyses, show these concerns to be largely 
unwarranted. 
Overall, the analyses provide some rational support for encouraging 
the use of the utility function as an important step on the road to cost-
accounting in human resources functions. It is obvious that there is 
no "best" personnel decision, as the utility of any decision will depend 
on value judgments (i.e., what constitutes an "acceptable" increase in 
job performance). However, if an organization is willing to invest at 
least a amount of time and effort (in terms of consideration of 
real-life organizational parameters and their possible discrepancy from 
theoretical assumptions), it should be relatively easy to derive estimates 
of the range of utilities than can reasonably be expected to accrue to 
the organization as the result of a particular decision. Ideally, this 
will allow decision-makers to evaluate a proposed decision in terms of 
the minimum and maximum benefits that can be expected, and, hence, 
should help the process of organizational decision-making become more 
efficient. 
Directions for Future Research 
Although the utility function as is appears to be tenable for ba­
sic cost-benefit analyses of human resources activities, several im-
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portant considerations may affect the viability of the function's use, 
as well as the interpretability of utility estimates. As such, a dis­
cussion of these concerns is warranted. 
The foregoing manipulations have estimated the degree to which the 
utility function as it is robust, as well as the approximate impact of 
deviations from underlying assumptions. While such analyses are neces­
sary to assess the potential magnitude of objective error (that is, the 
degree to which discrepancies in empirical versus theoretical distribu­
tions may affect utility estimates), and, hence, are important as a first 
step in the determination of the function's applicability, they obvious­
ly do not provide an infallible paradigm for cost-benefit decision-making 
in human resources functions. This caveat stems not from the function 
itself, but from the untenability of using the output of the function 
(even if that output is objectively correct) as the major criterion in 
decision-making. 
One inçortant drawback of the above analyses (and, indeed, of all 
utility analyses conducted to date), concerns the lack of applicability 
of the function for many decision-making situations. In the Schmidt 
et al. (1979) application, the reported gains in dollars were obviously 
quite substantial (i.e., on the order of millions of dollars per year). 
While this is certainly encouraging in the context of new hires for the 
federal government, it is obviously somewhat unrealistic in a small or 
medium-sized organization, which would not, in all likelihood, hire 
thousands of programmers per year. Few utility analyses point out. 
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however, that expected gains in utility must be evaluated relative to 
the organization in which the utility analysis is conducted. Projected 
gains may appear quite modest when compared to gains reported in most 
published studies; however, such projected gains may be far more en­
couraging than they initially appear if they are evaluated in the con­
text of the organization in question. 
A second complicating factor, though related, is somewhat more ab­
stract in nature. The utility function is intended to describe the 
expected benefit (ideally expressed in dollars, but possibly, as noted 
above, expressed in other terms, such as increase in standardized marginal 
utility, where utility refers to expected per-person increase in stand­
ardized job performance) of a proposed change in some aspect of human 
resources functions given certain parameters (i.e., distributions of 
predictor and criterion performance, increase in predictor validity, 
etc.). Although "correctness" of assumptions (i.e., use of the appro­
priate density for the distribution of predictor performance) is ob­
viously important in generating reasonable estimates of expected utili­
ty, such correctedness is not sufficient to ensure that decisions made 
with these estimates (even if the estimates themselves are highly ac­
curate) will be correct. This is due to the subjectivity necessary in 
evaluating the desirability of a given amount of utility. How much 
utility is too little (i.e., too little to warrant the implementation 
of a proposed change) ? How much is enough? There is at present no 
obiective means available to determine when projected gains in utility 
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are significant. 
Thus, after conducting a utility analysis (ostensibly to determine 
the expected cost-benefit ratio of, perhaps, a new selection system or 
a modified training program), the decision-maker is left with a number, 
or a set of numbers, which may have little intuitive meaning. Inter­
pretation of these numbers may be further confounded by the variability 
in base rates. If base rates are low, then a small increase in absolute 
utility will appear to be relatively large, and, hence, may result in 
a decision to implement the proposed change (despite the fact that the 
expected job performance after the implementation of the proposed change 
may still not be very high). 
Conversely, high base rates may make the relative utility of a 
proposed change appear modest and, hence, may dissuade the organization 
from implementation of the change (when, in fact, expected job performance 
after the change might be much higher than in the first instance). In 
essence, the expected average level of job performance may be higher 
in the second case than in the first, but because the absolute gain in 
utility predicted in the second case may be smaller than in the first, 
but the resulting decisions may run counter to intuition (i.e., the 
first decision may appear to be "better" than the second decision). The 
point here is not that any particular amount of utility is negligible 
or modest or marvelous, but that the function as is does not provide 
any mechanism by which expected gains in utility can be objectively 
evaluated. 
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In essence, we have come full circle. We began by examining tra­
ditional measures of evaluating human resources functions (such as per­
centages or correlations) and found most, if not all, of these measures 
to be inadequate as measures of the true efficacy of a personnel func­
tion. The major weakness appeared to be that too few other important 
parameters (such as costs, number of individuals involved, etc.) were 
generally not considered, and the resulting numbers obtained with such 
measures were underestimates. The utility function was proposed as a 
much more conceptually descriptive alternative, because it was able to 
take such parameters into account and, ostensibly, provide a "bottom-
line" estimate of the true value of any human resource function. 
The next major step involved a determination of the utility func­
tion's robustness, as the degree"to which the function is affected by 
departures from the statistical assumptions on which it is based is 
obviously a major consideration in calling for widespread application 
of the function. Despite the optimistic conclusions, vis-à-vis the 
robustness of the function, the utility function in its present form is 
somewhat short of an ideal paradigm"for objective decision-making. The 
coefficient of determination was criticized because it tended to under­
estimate the real value of, for example, a particular selection device. 
With utility estimates, we have an even more serious problem in inter­
pretation — we have no objective criteria against which to evaluate such 
estimates. 
While we can determine with some degree of confidence whether or 
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not a utility estimate (or a set of such estimates) is "correct," even 
such correctness cannot guarantee a correct decision at this stage of 
investigation. Thus, although the function represents a major step on 
the road to accountability in human resources functions, further con­
sideration of how to best improve its interpretability (and, hence, ap­
plicability) is certainly warranted. 
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